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Abstract
In my thesis, I study three important issues in industrial organization.
Chapter 1 studies the impact of vertical integration on innovation in an industry where firms
need to undertake risky R&D investments at both production and distribution stages. Vertical
integration brings better coordination within the integrated firm, which boosts its investment
incentive at both upstream and downstream levels. However, it is only mutually beneficial for firms
to integrate when both upstream and downstream innovations are important. When innovation
only matters at one level, firms favor instead vertical separation. The analysis provides insights
for the wave of mergers and R&D outsourcing observed in the pharmaceutical industry and other
vertically related industries.
Chapter 2 studies the effect of quality discrimination on product designs. In the context
of Internet, content providers are subject to quality discrimination from the Internet Service
Providers. We show that content providers are biased to choose broader designs. This reduces
product differentiation in the market, and intervention is necessary to achieve efficiency in the
content market. The result brings new insights into the discussion about net neutrality, which
mandates equal access to every participant on the Internet.
Chapter 3 studies the role of advertisements in attracting and manipulating attention from
consumers. When a product is characterized by several attributes, firms also strategically use
advertisements to manipulate the attention of consumers. A monopolist tends to advertise too few
attributes, and competition does not necessarily improve the situation. Moreover, in an attention-
scarce economy, competition for consumers attention leads firms to advertise fewer attributes and
reduces information available to consumers.
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Re´sume´
Dans ma the`se, j’e´tudie trois questions importantes dans l’e´conomie industrielle.
Chapitre 1 e´tudie l’impact de l’inte´gration verticale sur l’innovation dans une industrie ou` les
entreprises doivent entreprendre des R&D investissements risque´s a` des e´tapes de production et
de distribution. L’inte´gration verticale permet une meilleure coordination au sein de l’entreprise
inte´gre´e, qui renforce son incitation a` l’investissement aux niveaux amont et en aval. Cependant,
ce n’est que be´ne´fique pour les entreprises d’inte´grer quand innovations a` la fois en amont et en
aval sont importantes. Quand l’innovation compte qu’a` un seul niveau, les entreprises favorisent
la se´paration verticale. L’analyse donne un aperc¸u de la vague de fusions et R&D sous-traitance
observe´es dans l’industrie pharmaceutique et d’autres industries verticale.
Chapitre 2 e´tudie l’effet de la discrimination de la qualite´ sur la conception des produits.
Dans le contexte de l’Internet, les fournisseurs de contenu sont l’objet de discrimination de la
qualite´ des fournisseurs de services Internet. Nous montrons que les fournisseurs de contenu sont
biaise´es a` choisir un design plus larges. Cela re´duit la diffe´renciation des produits sur le marche´,
et l’intervention est ne´cessaire pour atteindre l’efficacite´ dans le marche´ du contenu. Le re´sultat
apporte un nouvel e´clairage sur le de´bat sur la neutralite´ du net, qui impose l’e´galite´ d’acce`s a`
tous les participants sur Internet.
Chapitre 3 e´tudie le roˆle de la publicite´ pour attirer et manipuler l’attention des consom-
mateurs. Quand un produit est caracte´rise´ par plusieurs attributs, les entreprises utilisent aussi
strate´gique annonces de manipuler l’attention des consommateurs. Un monopole a tendance a`
annoncer trop peu d’attributs, et la concurrence n’ame´liore pas ne´cessairement la situation. En
outre, dans une e´conomie de l’attention-rares, la concurrence pour l’attention des consommateurs
conduit les entreprises a` annoncer moins d’attributs et re´duit l’information a` la disposition des
consommateurs.
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Chapter 1
Vertical Integration
Innovation is a driving force for most industries, where it moreover affects many
stages of the vertical chain. We study the impact of vertical integration on innovation
in an industry where firms need to undertake risky R&D investments at both produc-
tion and distribution stages. Vertical integration brings better coordination within the
integrated firm, which boosts its investment incentive at both upstream and down-
stream levels. However, it is only mutually beneficial for firms to integrate when both
upstream and downstream innovations are important. When innovation only matters
at one level, firms favor instead vertical separation. The analysis provides insights for
the wave of mergers and R&D outsourcing observed in the pharmaceutical industry
and other vertically related industries.
1.1 Introduction
In a number of vertically related industries, innovative investment takes place at both upstream
and downstream levels. For instance, in the pharmaceutical industry, upstream firms invest into
the discovery of new drugs, and downstream firms seek to enhance development and manufacturing.
This industry, in which some firms are vertically integrated whereas others are not,1 has moreover
gone through a consolidation process in recent years, where integration with biotech firms plays
1Big Pharmaceutical companies are vertically integrated, but many biotech companies and research institutions
are only present in the upstream market, and most generic manufacturers are only active in the downstream market.
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an important role.2 At the same time, however, we also witness an outburst of R&D outsourcing,3
especially in the more traditional segment which relies on chemistry-based technology.
Our purpose in this paper is to study firms’ integration decision when innovation matters.
We show that it is optimal for firms to integrate vertically only when innovation is important
at both upstream and downstream levels. This provides an explanation for the two opposing
trends observed in the pharmaceutical industry. Vertical integration is observed in the biotech
segment, where biology-based drug development processes requires innovation from both discovery
and development, and even from manufacturing; by contrast, outsourcing occurs in the more
traditional segment, where chemistry-based processes requires innovation mostly at the discovery
stage.4
We derive our insights within a simple model where both upstream and downstream markets
of a vertically related industry are characterized by a duopoly. Key ingredients are: (i) upstream
inputs are homogeneous and downstream firms have unit demand; (ii) at each level, a firm may
need to undertake risky investment; and (iii) firms bargain over the terms of supply ex post, if
investment has been successful.
Vertical integration changes merging firms’ investment incentives in three ways. First, there
2Horizontal mergers between Big Pharmaceutical companies have attracted most of the attention, (For instance,
Pfizer has acquired Warner−Lambert, Pharmacia, Wyeth and King Pharmaceuticals since 2000. Other mergers
include Merck/Schering-Plough, Teva/Barr, and so forth.) but vertical integration is also an important part of this
consolidation process. According to the Global Pharma and Biotech M&A Report 2012 of IMAP, 6 out of the 15
largest transactions in 2011 are R&D driven. The most notable acquisitions include Merck’s 5.4 billion euros bid
for Millipore and Astellas Pharma’s 3.5 billion dollars bid for OSI Pharmaceuticals. More recently, the world third
largest pharmaceutical company Roche has attempted to acquire the two leading gene-testing companies Illumina
and Life Technologies. Not only does vertical integration happen in developed markets such as North America,
Europe and Japan, it is also becoming more and more important in emerging markets such as China. In 2012,
China Pharmaceutical Group acquired the research and production capacity of Robust Sun Holdings for 1.2 billion
dollars.
3For instance, outsourcing of preclinical development in China is projected to increase at an annual rate of 16%,
according to the report of JZMed, 2012.
4The insights also apply to other industries where innovation plays an important role. For instance, in the
satellite navigation industry, Tele Atlas and Navteq are the two main upstream firms for navigable digital map
databases. In 2008, Tele Atlas and Navteq were subsequently acquired by two main downstream firms TomTom
and Nokia. Also in the smartphone and tablet industry, industry giants Google and Microsoft both integrate to
the design stage, rather than remain only as operating system providers.
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is a coordination effect. Vertical integration brings better coordination within the integrated
firm, by eliminating the hold-up problem. This enhances investment incentives at both upstream
and downstream levels. Furthermore, as investments are strategic substitutes, independent firms
invest less, which generates additional benefit for the integrated firm. The magnitude of this
effect is the greatest when innovation matters both upstream and downstream, whereas it is null
when only downstream innovation matters. Second, there is a downstream amplifying effect: the
benefit from better coordination in the downstream market augments the benefit from better
coordination in the upstream market. This is because for an integrated upstream firm, when
it is the only upstream innovator, it captures a larger downstream profit, as integration fosters
higher downstream investment. This effect is present only when risky investments take place both
upstream and downstream. Third, there is also an insurance effect which lowers the investment
incentive of the integrated firm. This effect stems from the risky nature of investment, and reflects
the fact that each division of the integrated firm obtains positive profit even if its investment fails,
provided that the other division was successful. The overall effect of vertical integration is a boost
of both upstream and downstream investments for the integrated firm.
It follows that single integration is always profitable: the joint profit of an upstream firm
and a downstream firm is higher when they are integrated than when separated, assuming that
the other firms remain separated. The remaining independent firms also have incentive to inte-
grate, however, since a first vertical merger has already taken place. Hence, in a static setting,
we would expect pairwise integration, each upstream firm being integrated with a downstream
firm. However, the profit of an integrated firm is higher under pairwise integration than under
vertical separation only when innovation matters both upstream and downstream. Hence, when
innovation matters only upstream, firms fall into a prisoner’s dilemma: their joint profit is actu-
ally higher under vertical separation. When innovation matters both upstream and downstream,
inefficiency stems from under-investment; vertical integration then reduces the inefficiency and
benefits all firms. When instead innovation matters only upstream, the inefficiency comes from
over-investment; vertical integration thus exacerbates the inefficiency. When firms interact repeat-
edly, they may thus want and be able to avoid the prisoner’s dilemma, in which case firms may
remain separated (or outsource upstream production if such outsourcing contract is feasible). This
is what happened in the pharmaceutical industry: for traditional drug development processes, the
risk of investment concentrates more and more in the discovery stage; firms then favor vertical
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separation and outsource their R&D activities through contract research organizations(CROs).
But for the newer processes based on biology, risk persists from discovery to development, and
firms choose to integrate vertically.
Our paper contributes to the literature on vertical integration and foreclosure, which dates
back to the seminal paper of Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990). Most of the literature along
this line focuses on downstream foreclosure, which rests on the concern that the integrated up-
stream firm may restrict its supply to independent downstream firms. In a successive duopoly
model, downstream foreclosure could benefit the independent upstream firm: by restricting its
supply to the independent downstream firm, the integrated upstream firm grants market power
to the independent upstream firm vis-a-vis the independent downstream firm. Our results can
be interpreted as the upstream foreclosure effect of vertical integration through the channel of
investment. Moreover, when taken upstream investment into consideration, vertical integration
instead hurts the independent upstream firm. Most of previous works on the effect of vertical
integration on investments tends to focus on investment decisions on one level only, upstream or
downstream. Bolton and Whinston (1993), Buehler and Schmutzler (2008) and Allain et al. (2012)
focus for instance on downstream investment; whereas Brocas (2003) and Chen and Sappington
(2010) study instead upstream investment. Hart and Tirole (1990) consider the case with both
upstream and downstream investments, but there the investment is a discrete, riskiness choice.
We provide instead a unified model where risky, continuous investment can take place at both
levels of a vertically related industry. This allows us to compare the effect of vertical integration
under different market configurations, and to understand how the importance of innovation affects
industry dynamics. Our paper is also related to the literature on innovation of complementary
products. Farrell and Katz (2000) show that integration into a complementary product market
allows a monopolist to extract more rent from its core market. Schmidt (2009) studies how ver-
tical integration affects a patent holder’s incentive to license its patent to downstream producers.
Horizontal complementarity is the main focus of these papers, whereas complementarity is vertical
in our paper.
The paper proceeds as follows: We present the basic framework in Section 2. Section 3 stud-
ies two benchmark situations, where only upstream innovation or only downstream innovation
matters. Section 4 analysis the case when both upstream and downstream innovations are impor-
tant. We discuss the welfare implications in Section 5. Section 6 provides some extensions and
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discussion. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are presented in the Appendices.
1.2 The Framework
We consider an industry which consists of an upstream market and a downstream market.
There are two upstream firms UA and UB, and two downstream firms D1 and D2. All firms are
risk neutral. Each Dj, for j = 1, 2, requires one (non-divisible) unit of input.
5 In order to produce
in the market, each firm may need to make a costly investment, the outcome of which is uncertain.
We consider the following four-stage game:
• Stage 1: Upstream Investment. Upstream firms choose their investments Ei, for i = A,B;
their outcomes realize and are observed by all firms.
• Stage 2: Downstream Investment. Downstream firms choose their investments ej, for j =
1, 2; their outcomes realize and are also observed by all firms.
• Stage 3: Bargaining. Successful upstream and downstream firms bargain over supply con-
ditions; inputs are delivered and payments made accordingly.
• Stage 4: Final Product Market. Final product market and payoffs to downstream firms
realize. Competition in the downstream market determines the profits (gross of payments
for input) of D1 and D2.
Upstream Technology. We model the upstream investment as follows: by investing CU(Ei) =
cuE
2
i /2, with probability Ei, Ui obtains an innovation that enables it to supply downstream firms.
With probability 1 − Ei, the investment fails and Ui stays out of the market. We assume that
there is no marginal cost of production. Thus, the total cost for an upstream firm is the fixed cost
of investment. Furthermore, there is no capacity constraint or any other shock that may constrain
the production of Ui, and each Ui can supply both downstream firms if it wishes so.
Downstream Technology. Similarly, by investing CD(ej) = cde
2
j/2, each Dj succeeds with
probability ej in becoming able to transform the input into the final product on a one-to-one basis
5We make this unit demand assumption for ease of exposition. This is also a natural assumption for the phar-
maceutical industry, where downstream prices are heavily regulated, and demand is moreover mainly determined
by other factors than prices. However, our main results remain valid with an elastic demand.
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at zero cost.6 In case of failure, which happens with probability 1− ej, Dj is out of the market.
We consider non-channel specific investments, and thus any successful upstream or downstream
firm can trade with both firms on the other side. In other words, upstream inputs are perfect
substitutes for both downstream firms.7 This reflects the fact that downstream development
methods and resources are not designed for a particular drug, instead they are flexible and can be
easily adapted.
Bargaining. To model the bargaining between successful upstream and downstream firms, we
adopt a simple procedure which applies to all scenarios with either a monopoly or a duopoly at each
level, and with or without vertical integration, namely, with equal probability, either the upstream
firms, or the downstream firms, make offers to the other side.8 More Specifically, the bargaining
procedure goes as follows: With probability 1/2, upstream firms make simultaneous offers to
downstream firms, which choose whether to accept or reject each offer; With complementary
probability 1/2, downstream firms make offers and upstream firms make acceptance or rejection
decisions; having observed all offers and acceptance decisions, downstream firms then choose
whether to purchase the input and from which upstream firm to purchase.
We do not allow explicit exclusive dealing offers.9 An offer is therefore simply a price for one
unit of input. Note however that, upstream firms can make constructive refusal offers (where the
offer to one downstream firm will be rejected), and downstream firms can offer payments that are
conditional on actually purchasing the input, both of which may lead to ex post exclusive dealing.
All offers and acceptance decisions are publicly observable. For ease of exposition, we assume
that whenever a firm is indifferent between accepting and rejecting an offer, it chooses to accept.
Moreover, when D1 is indifferent between purchasing from UA and UB, it chooses to purchase from
6Zero production cost at both upstream and downstream markets is also a natural assumption for the pharma-
ceutical industry, where a dominant part of total cost comes from R&D.
7The assumption of perfect substitution simplifies our analysis, but is not crucial to our results. In pharmaceu-
tical industries, downstream investments mainly include equipments, clinical tests, human resources and etc, which
are not specific to upstream inputs. In other words, a downstream firm can develop any potential drugs discovered
by upstream firms as long as it gets access to those drugs. Also in the satellite navigation industry, downstream
manufacturers can easily adapt their devices to any upstream map database provider.
8That is, whether the offers are made upstream or downstream is channel independent: ex post, the bargaining
power is at market level rather than at firm level.
9Whether exclusive dealing should be allowed or not is not the focus of this paper. However, we briefly discuss
the situation when exclusive offers are allowed in Section 6.
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UA; similarly, D2 chooses to purchase from UB in case of indifference.
Final Product Market. Given the unit demand assumption, input prices do not affect down-
stream firms’ gross payoffs in the final product market; these payoffs depend on whether they are
competing or not. If Dj is the only active firm in the downstream market, it gets (gross) profit
∆; if both downstream firms are active, each one only gets a profit of δ. Hence, the payoffs for
downstream firms are described as Table 1,
Table 1.1: Final Product Market Payoffs
HHHHHHHHH
D1
D2
A N
A δ,δ ∆,0
N 0,∆ 0,0
where “A”and “N”indicate whether a firm is active or not active in the downstream market. We
assume that 0 < 2δ < ∆: competition dissipates part of the industry profit, but not all of it. It
follows that if Ui is the only upstream innovator, the industry profit is maximized when Ui only
sells to one of the two downstream firms.
When conducting welfare analysis, we will interpret the final product market using a simple
Hotelling model. The two downstream firms are located at the end points of a segment of length 1.
A representative unit demand consumer is randomly located on the line, according to the uniform
distribution, and the consumer has valuation v for the product. In addition, the consumer incurs
a transportation cost which is t per unit distance. We assume that v is large enough compared to
t, i.e. v > 2t, to ensure that the market is always fully covered, regardless of the market structure.
Hence, when there is only one downstream firm, it charges price v− t and obtains profit ∆ = v− t;
when there are two downstream firms, they charge the same price p = t and obtain profit δ = t/2.
Finally, to guarantee that profit functions are well-defined and optimal investments are interior
solutions, we assume that:
Assumption 1.1. cu ≥ ∆ and cd ≥ ∆.
Remarks. We make three remarks about the game. First, we assume that downstream firms
invest after observing the outcomes of upstream investments. This simplifies the analysis and
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allows us to better separate the effect of vertical integration at upstream and downstream level.
Moreover, with sequential investments, we avoid socially wasteful downstream investment.10
Second, we assume that if the investment failed, the firm is out of the market. That is,
innovation is drastic, which is a good approximation for the pharmaceutical industry; yet, our
main results hold for non-drastic innovation as well. Similarly, the main insights of our paper still
hold when there is a competitive fringe in the upstream and/or the downstream markets, which
does not invest but can produce a basic version of the product.
Third, we assume that innovations are protected by patents, and we do not consider issues such
as information leakage, reverse engineering, infringement and so forth. These topics are interesting
on their own, but we focus here on the effect of vertical integration.
1.3 Two Benchmarks: One-Sided Innovation
To distinguish the main forces at work, we start with two benchmark situations where innova-
tion matters at only one level, either upstream or downstream. When only downstream innovation
matters, vertical integration has no effect on downstream investment incentives. This is because
upstream competition is always present in this situation, and thus upstream firms supply at cost.
When only upstream innovation matters, vertical integration improves the coordination within
the integrated firm, which fosters its incentive to invest; as investments are strategic substitutes,
the other upstream firm invests less. However, firms may fall into a prisoner’s dilemma: each pair
of upstream and downstream firms has incentive to integrate, but their joint profit is higher when
all firms are separated than when all are integrated.
We proceed backwards. The outcome of the bargaining stage is common in both benchmark
situations. Lemma 1.1 summarizes the findings.
Lemma 1.1. (i) If there is monopoly on one market and a duopoly on the other market, the mo-
nopolist obtains ∆ and the duopolists obtain zero profit; (ii) if there is bilateral duopoly, upstream
firms supply at cost (0), and each downstream firm obtains δ.11
Proof. See Appendix A.
10If both upstream firms failed in investments, there would be no value of downstream investments.
11In these two benchmark situations, there is a duopoly in at least one market. The situation of bilateral
monopoly only appears when both upstream and downstream innovations matter.
17
1.3.1 Only Downstream Innovation matters
We begin with the situation when only downstream innovation matters. Clearly, the presence
of upstream competition drives the input price down to zero. Therefore, whether or not it is
integrated, each downstream firm obtains ∆ when it is the sole innovator in downstream market,
and δ when instead both downstream firms are successful. Thus the payoffs to downstream firms
are as described by Table 1. It follows that Dj chooses its investment ej so as to maximize, for
j′ 6= j ∈ {1, 2},
ejej′δ + ej(1− ej′)∆− CD(ej).
As cu ≥ ∆, Dj’s best response has slope between −1 and 0, and the unique equilibrium in the
investment game is
e1 = e2 = eD =
∆
cd + ∆− δ .
This leads to:
Proposition 1.1. Downstream Innovation. When only downstream innovation matters,
downstream investments are not affected by vertical integration. Firms are indifferent between
integration and separation.
Bolton and Whinston (1993) show instead that an integrated downstream firm invests more
than an independent downstream firm, when there is an upstream monopolist and supply un-
certainty. Allain et al. (2012) show that vertical integration has a foreclosure effect in case of
concerns about information leakage. This neutrality result stems from the assumption that both
upstream firms are reliable suppliers of a homogenous input.
1.3.2 Only Upstream Innovation matters
Suppose now that both downstream firms are always active, and only upstream innovation
matters.
1.3.2.1 Vertical Separation
When only one upstream firm succeeds, it monopolizes the input market and obtains ∆. When
instead both succeed, Bertrand-like competition leads both upstream firms to supply at cost. The
payoff matrix for upstream firms is therefore given by:
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Table 1.2: Upstream Payoff Under Separation
HHHHHHHHH
UA
UB
S F
S 0,0 ∆,0
F 0,∆ 0,0
where “S”and “F”indicate whether Ui succeeds or fails in investment.
It follows that each Ui chooses an investment level Ei so as to maximize, for i
′ 6= i ∈ {A,B},
Ei(1− Ei′)∆− CU(Ei),
leading to a best response function BRV Si (Ei′), characterized by
cuEi = (1− Ei′)∆. (1.1)
As cu ≥ ∆, the investment game has a unique equilibrium, given by
EA = EB = EU =
∆
cu + ∆
.
1.3.2.2 Single Vertical Integration
Suppose now that UA and D1, say, are vertically integrated whereas UB and D2 remain sepa-
rated. The only difference with the situation of vertical separation is when both upstream firms
are successful. As shown in Lemma 1.1, the input price is then driven down to zero no matter
who makes the offers; the independent upstream firm thus gets zero profit, but the integrated firm
obtains profit δ from its downstream affiliate. The payoff matrix for UA −D1 and UB is thus as
given by Table 1.3.
Table 1.3: Upstream Payoffs under Integration
HHHHHHHHH
UA −D1
UB
S F
S δ,0 ∆,0
F 0,∆ 0,0
Hence UB’s investment E
U
B is still given by the best response (1.1), whereas UA −D1 chooses
EUA so as to maximize
EA(1− EUB )∆ + EAEUBδ − CU(EA),
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which leads to the best response function BRV IA (EB), characterized by
cuE
U
A = (1− EB)∆ + EBδ. (1.2)
Vertical integration brings better coordination within the integrated firm: the integrated up-
stream firm UA now maximizes the joint profit of UA and D1, which is positive even if both
upstream firms are successful. This improved coordination boosts the investment incentive of the
integrated upstream firm. As upstream investments are strategic substitutes, the independent
upstream firm invests less. Denote by EU+ the investment of the integrated upstream firm, and
EU− that of the independent upstream firm when innovation only matters upstream, we have:
Proposition 1.2. Upstream Innovation. When only upstream innovation matters, the inte-
grated upstream firm invests more than the independent upstream firm: EU+ > EU > E
U
− .
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Figure 1.1: Upstream Investment when only Upstream Innovation Matters
The proposition is illustrated by Figure 1.1. The equilibrium investment is determined by the
intersection of two best response functions BRA(EB) and BRB(EA). The best response function
for the independent upstream firm UB is not affected by integration. However, integration of UA
and D1 leads to a clockwise rotation of the best response function of UA, which clearly shows
that the integrated upstream firm UA invests more than under vertical separation, whereas the
independent upstream firm UB invests less.
Brocas (2003) obtains similar effect of vertical integration in a bilateral duopoly model where
upstream firms invest in process innovation, but her focus is on the effect of switching cost and
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technology choice. Chen and Sappington (2010) also consider the effect of vertical integration on
upstream investment incentives. However, they only consider the case with an upstream monopo-
list, and their focus is on how the effect of vertical integration depends on downstream competition.
Our focus in the paper is not restricted to the effect of integration on upstream investments, but
rather on the difference between different market settings.
1.3.2.3 Incentives to Integrate
Proposition 1.2 indicates that it is profitable for UA and D1 to integrate. The joint profit of
UA and D1 is
piUA−D1(EA, EB) = EA(1− EB)∆ + EAEBδ − cu
E2A
2
,
and it is easy to show that piUA−D1(E
U
+ , E
U
−) > piUA−D1(EU , E
U
−) > piUA−D1(EU , EU). The first
inequality reflects the gain from better coordination within the integrated firm, which is the term
EAEBδ, as well as the fact that the integrated firm adapts to UB’s investment E
U
B . And the second
inequality holds because UA now faces a less aggressive competitor in the upstream market.
Similar reasoning implies that it is profitable for UB and D2 to integrate as well, in response
to the merger of UA and D1. The joint profit of UB and D2 is
piUB−D2(EA, EB) = EB(1− EA)∆ + EBEAδ − cu
E2B
2
,
and, letting EPIU denote the symmetric equilibrium investment under pairwise integration, we have:
piUB−D2(E
U
+ , E
U
−) < piUB−D2(E
PI
U , E
U
−) < piUB−D2(E
PI
U , E
PI
U ). The first inequality holds because UA
becomes less aggressive: EPIU < E
U
A , from strategic substitution. The second inequality follows as
UB and D2 also coordinate better after the integration, and moreover react to the change in EA.
Therefore, not only is the first integration profitable, the second integration is also profitable.
The outcome is such that firms fall into a prisoner’s dilemma. Each pair of upstream and down-
stream firms has incentive to integrate, but the joint profit of each pair is lower under pairwise
integration than under vertical separation:
Proposition 1.3. When only upstream innovation matters, the joint profit of each pair of up-
stream and downstream firms is higher under vertical separation than under pairwise integration.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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When innovation matters only at the upstream level, competition leads to over-investment.
Integration further boosts investment incentives, which exacerbates the situation. Hence, in a
static game, firms are worse off under pairwise integration. Repeated interaction can provide an
easy solution to the prisoner’s dilemma: in a game where firms play the above investment game
repeatedly over time, and firms choose whether to integrate or not at the beginning of each new
period, then patient enough firms could sustain a collusive-like market outcome where all firms
remain separated.12
1.3.3 Comparing the Two Benchmarks
Vertical integration has different effects in the two benchmark situations. When only upstream
innovation matters, vertical integration results in a crowding-out effect; when instead only down-
stream innovation matters, it has no effect. The divergence is here extreme, due to the assumption
of homogeneous products upstream. Still, we show in Section 6 that, more generally, vertical in-
tegration has a larger impact on upstream investment than on downstream investment. This is
because upstream competition is more intense than downstream competition. Simply speaking,
upstream firms compete to sell to each of the two downstream firms, whereas downstream firms
would not compete to purchase the input from both upstream firms.
This suggests that it is the upstream firms that benefit more from integration, and that incen-
tives to integrate are higher when innovative investments take place in the upstream market rather
than downstream. Our result differs from that of de Fontenay and Gans (2005), who show that
either upstream firm or downstream firm may benefit more from integration. Their analysis relies
on the Shapley value, and thus in case of a monopoly, the industry profit depends on whether the
monopolist is upstream or downstream. By contrast, in our setting, the industry profit is ∆ no
matter where is the monopolist.
1.4 Two-Sided Innovation
When innovation matters at both levels, upstream and downstream investments are comple-
mentary, as there is no value for the final product when innovation fails at either level. It follows
12As we show in the extension, if we allow firms to contract on upstream innovation, they can do at least as well
as under vertical separation, or may do even better.
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that vertical integration affects downstream market as well, which in turn reinforces the impact
on upstream investments identified in the previous section. As we will see, vertical integration can
now moreover be mutually beneficial for all firms.
1.4.1 Downstream Investment
Vertical integration has no impact on downstream investments when both or none of the
upstream firms succeed. In the former situation, downstream firms invest as if only downstream
innovation mattered, and Proposition 1.1 shows that vertical integration has no impact. In the
latter situation, downstream innovation is worthless, and thus no downstream firm invests. Vertical
integration however has an impact when only one upstream firm succeeds, say UA.
1.4.1.1 Vertical Separation
If UA is vertically separated, when only one downstream firm succeeds, there is a bilateral
monopoly. Hence, the downstream firm shares the profit with UA and obtains ∆/2. When both
downstream firms succeed, UA monopolizes the market and each downstream firm obtains 0. The
payoff matrix for downstream firms is thus given by:
Table 1.4: Downstream Payoffs under Separation
HHHHHHHHH
D1
D2
S F
S 0,0 ∆
2
,0
F 0,∆
2
0,0
Then Dj chooses an investment level ej so as to maximize, for j
′ 6= j ∈ {1, 2},
ej(1− ej′)∆
2
− cd
e2j
2
.
Hence, each Dj’s best response BR
V S
j (ej′), is characterized by
cdej = (1− ej′)∆
2
. (1.3)
Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique equilibrium : e1 = e2 = e
V S, given by
cde
V S = (1− eV S)∆
2
.
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It is obvious that, under vertical separation, downstream firms are subject to serious hold-up
problem, and thus their investments are insufficient.
Proposition 1.4. If only one upstream firm succeeds and it is vertically separated, downstream in-
vestment is insufficient: it is lower than the industry profit maximizing and the welfare maximizing
level of investment.
Proof. See Appendix A.
1.4.1.2 Vertical Integration
If UA is integrated with one of the two downstream firms, say D1, then when only the inde-
pendent downstream firm D2 succeeds, D2 and UA−D1 share the market profit and each obtains
∆/2. When instead only D1 succeeds, the integrated firm UA −D1 obtains a profit of ∆. Finally,
when both downstream firms succeed, UA monopolizes the market and the integrated firm UA−D1
obtains ∆. The payoff matrix is thus given by:
Table 1.5: Downstream Payoffs under Integration
HHHHHHHHH
UA −D1
D2
S F
S ∆,0 ∆,0
F ∆
2
,∆
2
0,0
D2’s best response remains BR
V S
2 , as given by (1.3). By contrast, D1 now chooses e1 so as to
maximize
e1∆ + (1− e1)e2 ∆
2
− cd e
2
1
2
,
leading to D1’s best response BR
V I
1 , characterized by
cde1 = ∆− e2 ∆
2
.
Denote by eV I+ and e
V I
− the investment of the integrated downstream firm and the independent
downstream firm, respectively, and we have the following result:
Proposition 1.5. If only one upstream firm succeeds and it is vertically integrated, the integrated
downstream firm invests more than the independent downstream firm: eV I+ > e
V S > eV I− .
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Proof. See Appendix A.
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Figure 1.2: Downstream Investment under Upstream Monopoly
Proposition 1.5 is illustrated by Figure 2. Vertical integration does not affect the independent
D2’s best response, but now boost that of the integrated D1, as it eliminates the hold-up problem
within the integrated firm. As downstream investments are strategic substitutes, in equilibrium
the independent downstream firm invests less. We now show that this effect on downstream
investments contributes here to foster upstream investment incentives. Denote by piV S the benefit
from its innovation for the only upstream innovator when it is vertically separated, given by
piV S = 2e
V S(1− eV S)∆
2
+ (eV S)2∆;
and denote by piV I the benefit when it is vertically integrated, given by
piV I = e
V I
+ ∆ + e
V I
− (1− eV I+ )
∆
2
− cd (e
V I
+ )
2
2
.
Lemma 1.2. If only one upstream firm succeeds, the benefit from its innovation is higher when it
is vertically integrated than when it is separated: piV I > piV S.
Proof. See Appendix A.
When the upstream monopolist is vertically separated, there is serious under-investment in the
downstream market due to hold-up problem. Vertical integration eliminates the problem within
the integrated firm, and fosters downstream investment; integration moreover reduces investment
of the independent firm, which further increases the benefit of the integrated firm.
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1.4.2 Upstream Innovation
Under vertical separation, when only one upstream firm succeeds, the subgame goes as in
Section 1.4.1.1, the upstream monopolist gets continuation payoff piV S. When both upstream
firms are successful, the subgame goes as Section 1.3.1, where each upstream firm obtains zero
profit. Therefore, the payoff matrix for the upstream firms is given by Table 1.6.
Table 1.6: Upstream Payoffs under Separation
HHHHHHHHH
UA
UB
S F
S 0,0 piV S,0
F 0,piV S 0,0
Each upstream firm’s best response, BRV Si (Ei′), is given by
cuEi = (1− Ei′)piV S. (1.4)
There is a unique equilibrium in the investment game: EA = EB = E
V S, given by
EV S =
piV S
cu + piV S
.
Suppose now UA and D1 integrate. When only the independent upstream firm UB succeeds,
the subgame goes as Section 1.4.1.1, where UB obtains piV S. In this circumstance, even though
UA does not have a successful upstream innovation, the integrated firm UA−D1 still gets positive
profit from D1 when it is the only downstream innovator. UA −D1’s expected profit, piDV S, which
is the profit of a downstream firm when the upstream monopolist is vertically separated, is thus
given by
piDV S = e
V S(1− eV S)∆
2
− cd (e
V S)2
2
.
When the integrated upstream firm UA is the only upstream innovator, the subgame goes as
Section 1.4.1.2, and UA obtains piV I .
When both upstream firms are successful, the subgame goes as Section 1.3.1. However, the
profit for the two upstream firms are different: the independent upstream firm UB obtains zero
profit; but the integrated firm obtains positive profit from its downstream affiliate; its expected
profit, piDV I , is given by
piDV I = e
2
Dδ + eD(1− eD)∆− cd
e2D
2
,
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where eD is the downstream investment when only downstream innovation matters.
The payoff matrix for upstream firms is therefore given by
Table 1.7: Upstream Payoffs under Integration
HHHHHHHHH
UA −D1
UB
S F
S piDV I ,0 piV I ,0
F piDV S,piV S 0,0
UB’s best response remains given by BR
V S
B , characterized by (1.4). The best response of the
integrated UA becomes instead driven by:
cuEA = (1− EB)piV I + (piDV I − piDV S)EB. (1.5)
Denote by EV I+ and E
V I
− the investment of the integrated upstream firm and the independent
upstream firm, respectively, we have:
Proposition 1.6. The integrated upstream firm invests more than the independent upstream firm:
EV I+ > E
V S > EV I− .
Proof. See Appendix A.
We can rewrite (1.5) as
cuEA = (1− EB)piV S + (1− EB)(piV I − piV S) + piDV IEB − piDV SEB,
and the impact of vertical integration is characterized by the last three terms on the right-hand
side: first, the same effect as analyzed in Section 1.3.2 still exists, i.e. piDV I > 0, which we refer to
as the Coordination Effect. The integrated upstream firm takes into account the positive impact
of UA’s investment on D1’s profit, which is positive when both upstream firms are successful. This
tends to increase the investment of UA.
Second, the elimination of hold-up problem between UA andD1 further increases the investment
incentive of the integrated upstream firm, which results from the fact that piV I > piV S. This effect
is only present when downstream innovation also matters: integration fosters stronger downstream
investment incentive, which increases the benefit from its innovation for an integrated upstream
monopolist. We call this second effect as Downstream Amplifying Effect.
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Third, the combination of upstream innovation and downstream innovation gives rise to an
Insurance Effect which reduces the investment incentive of the integrated upstream firm. This
originates from the fact that the integrated firm obtains positive profit even if it fails in upstream
investment, as the downstream affiliate D1 obtains a profit of ∆/2 when it is the only downstream
innovator, that is piDV S > 0. This negative effect is dominated, however, and the overall effect of
vertical integration is a strengthened crowding-out effect.
1.4.3 Incentives to Integrate
Similar to the arguments made in Section 1.3.2.3, it is profitable for UA and D1 to integrate,
the benefit of which comes from both the elimination of hold-up problem and lower investments
from independent firms. Moreover, given that UA and D1 have merged, it is also profitable for UB
and D2 to integrate. The joint profit of UB and D2 under vertical separation is
piV SUB−D2(EA, EB) = EAEBpi
D
V I + EB(1− EA)[piV S + piDV S] + EA(1− EB)piFV I − cu
E2B
2
,
where piDV S is the profit for a downstream firm when the only upstream innovator is vertically
separated; and piFV I is the profit of the independent downstream firm when the upstream monopolist
is vertically integrated, given by
piFV I = e
V I
− (1− eV I+ )
∆
2
− cd (e
V I
− )
2
2
.
And the joint profit under pairwise integration is
piPIUB−D2(EA, EB) = EAEBpi
D
V I + EB(1− EA)piV I + EA(1− EB)piFV I − cu
E2B
2
.
It is easy to check that piV SUB−D2(E
V I
+ , E
V I
− ) < pi
PI
UB−D2(E
V I
+ , E
V I
− ) < pi
PI
UB−D2(E
PI , EPI), where
EPI is the equilibrium upstream investment when there is pairwise integration. The first inequality
reflects the stand-alone gain from the elimination of hold-up problem; and the second inequality
shows the gain from being more aggressive, which lowers the investment of UA. As a result, the
integration of UA and D1 would be followed by the integration of UB and D2. However, the joint
profit of UA and D1 is still higher than what they would obtain under vertical separation.
Proposition 1.7. When innovation matters both upstream and downstream, industry profit is
higher under pairwise integration than under vertical separation.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Therefore, when innovation matters at both upstream and downstream markets, we are likely to
observe merger waves, as this leads to the market structure that maximizes industry profit (As each
integrated firm gets half of the industry profit, it also maximizes the profit of each integrated firm).
This is in contrast to when innovation only matters at one level, where pairwise integration either
has no effect (downstream innovation) or hurts both firms (upstream innovation). The reason is
intuitive: In all cases, vertical integration eliminates hold-up problems and boosts investments.
But when innovation matters only at one level, competition leads to over-investment, which is
then further exacerbated by vertical integration. When instead innovation matters at both levels,
multiplication of hold-up problems leads to under-investment (Proposition 1.4), which is alleviated
by vertical integration.
1.4.4 Industry Overview
The above analysis indicates that in an innovation-driven industry, we are likely to see more
integration if both upstream and downstream innovations are important; vertical integration may
not be common if investment matters only upstream or downstream, that is, if investment is risky
at only one level, firms are better-off with vertical separation.
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Figure 1.3: Vertical Separation vs Pairwise Integration
We can illustrate this with an example. Downstream product market is characterized by
the same Hotelling line as before, with the specification that v = 2 and t = 0.8. Moreover,
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suppose that cu + cd = 2.
13 Figure 1.3 shows the difference between industry profit under pairwise
integration and vertical separation, as the cost structure varies. As we can see, as cd → 0, we
are in the situation when only upstream innovation matters, where pairwise integration is strictly
dominated. As cu → 0 (cd → 2), we approach the situation when only downstream innovation
matters, and firms are indifferent between integration and separation. Integration is beneficial
and the equilibrium market structure features pairwise integration only when both innovations
are important.
From the point view of industry dynamics, at an early stage of the development of an industry,
innovation is likely to be important at each stage of the value chain and firms choose to integrate
vertically. As the importance of innovation moves more and more to one stage, firms begin to favor
vertical separation (or outsourcing when it is feasible). As what happens in the pharmaceutical
industry, for the traditional technology, it becomes more and more difficult to make discoveries in
the upstream research stage, and firms start to outsource their R&D activities.
1.5 Welfare Implications
We briefly discuss the welfare effect of vertical integration in this section. When only down-
stream innovation matters, vertical integration does not affect welfare; when only upstream inno-
vation matters, vertical integration improves social welfare if product differentiation in the final
product market is strong. Finally, if both upstream and downstream innovations are important,
vertical integration generally increases welfare.
1.5.1 One-Sided Innovation
When only downstream innovation matters, vertical integration has no effect on downstream
investments, and thus does not affect social welfare. When only upstream innovation matters,
consider first single vertical integration, the welfare effect comes from two aspects: on the benefit
side, total investment increases; on the cost side, vertical integration may lead to over-investment.
This is because the private gain from integration exceeds the social gain. With only one down-
stream firm, social surplus is v − t/2. With two downstream firms, this surplus becomes v − t/4.
13Thus we do not focus on the situation when optimal investments are interior. Instead, either upstream or
downstream investment can be zero or one.
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Thus, when one firm has already been successful, the social gain from a second successful firm is
t/4, whereas the private gain for the second firm is t/2.
The welfare function is given by
W = (EA + EB − EAEB)(v − t
2
) + EAEB
t
4
− cuE
2
A
2
− cuE
2
B
2
.
Thus, if the investment cost is high, welfare is largely determined by total investment, (EA +
EB)(v− t/2), which is higher under vertical integration. If instead investment cost is low, whether
vertical integration increases social welfare critically depends on the extent of downstream product
differentiation: when it is weak, the welfare gain from further upstream investment is limited, and
the negative effect of over-investment dominates. With stronger product differentiation, however,
the positive effect of higher upstream investment dominates and vertical integration increases
social welfare. A numerical example in Figure 4 (where we set v = 1) confirms this point.
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Figure 1.4: Welfare Effect of Single Integration when only Upstream Innovation matters
Now consider pairwise integration, as cu > ∆ = v − t, it is always optimal to have both firms
investing, and W is maximized at
EA = EB = E
∗ =
v − t/2
cu + v − 3t/4 ,
whereas the equilibrium investment levels under separation and pairwise integration are respec-
tively given by:
EU =
v − t
cu + v − t < E
∗ and EPIU =
v − t
cu + v − 3t/2 > E
∗.
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It is easy to check that, if cu ≥ 3t/2, we have EU + EPIU ≤ 2E∗, and pairwise integration always
increases social welfare compared with vertical separation. This comes from the fact the incentive
to over-invest is weaker under pairwise integration than under single integration, and the positive
effect of higher total investment dominates.
1.5.2 Two-Sided Innovation
Now consider the situation when innovation matters both upstream and downstream. Denote
by WD the social welfare in the continuation game when both upstream firms succeed; similarly,
denote by W V SM and W
V I
M the social welfare in the continuation game when there is only one
successful upstream firm, which is vertically separated or vertically integrated, respectively. Total
social welfare under vertical separation is then given by
W V S = (EV S)2WD + 2E
V S(1− EV S)W V SM − 2CU(EV S),
whereas under single vertical integration, it is given by
W V I = EV I+ E
V I
− WD + E
V I
+ (1− EV I− )W V IM + EV I− (1− EV I+ )W V SM − CU(EV I+ )− CU(EV I− ).
When investments are substantially lower than the efficient level (which is indeed the case
when innovation matters both upstream and downstream), welfare effects are mainly driven by
the impact on total investment. Single vertical integration increases social welfare in two ways:
First, social welfare is higher when the upstream monopolist is vertically integrated than when it
is vertically separated: W V SM < W
V I
M . Vertical integration moreover implies that the integrated
upstream firm is more likely to be the sole innovator in the upstream market. Second, total
investment is higher: EV I+ + E
V I
− > 2E
V S. Indeed, when innovation is important both upstream
and downstream, investment incentives are insufficient due to hold-up problems being present at
both levels. Vertical integration partially overcomes this problem and pushes investment levels
towards social optimum.
This suggests that pairwise integration may further increase social welfare, which becomes
W PI = (EPI)2WD + 2E
PI(1− EPI)W V IM − 2CU(EPI).
Further welfare improvement from pairwise integration comes from the fact that hold-up problem
is now eliminated within each integrated firm, and total investment is even higher: 2EPI >
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EV I+ + E
V I
− . The numerical example in Figure 5 (Where we set v = cu = cd = 1) confirms this
welfare effect.
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Figure 1.5: Welfare Effect with Two-Sided Innovation
1.6 Discussion and Extension
1.6.1 Robustness
Timing and Observability of Investments. We have assumed that upstream investment takes
place before downstream investment. However, the observability and the timing of investments
do not affect our main results. This is clearly the case when innovation only matters at one level.
When innovation matters both upstream and downstream, the driving force for our results is
the better coordination from the elimination of the hold-up problem within the integrated firm.
However, by assuming that downstream firms invest after observing the outcomes of upstream
investments, we avoid wasteful downstream investments when no upstream firm succeeds. More-
over, sequential investment allows us to better separate the impact of vertical integration on the
upstream market from its impact on the downstream market.
Secret Contracting. We have assumed that in the bargaining stage, all offers and acceptance
decisions are publicly observable. Secret offers may reduce the profit of an upstream monopolist,
due to the classic opportunistic problem. And thus there is additional incentive to integrate
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vertically if offers are not observable.
Elastic Demand. A simplification in our analysis is that downstream firms have unit demands.
When instead downstream firms have an elastic demand, vertical integration generates additional
foreclosure for independent downstream firms through a “raising rivals’ cost”effect, which has
been extensively analyzed in the literature. This foreclosure effect exacerbates crowding-out down-
stream, which in turn further strengthens crowding-out upstream. Our qualitative results do not
change, however, as the resolution of coordination problems within the integrated firm still plays
a role in these settings. However, by relying on unit demand and observable offers, we can better
focus on the effect of vertical integration through the channel of investment.
Interim Bargaining. In the discussion above, we have assumed that firms bargain after all
outcomes of investments have realized and been observed by all firms. The main insights in
our paper still hold if bargaining happens in an interim stage, that is, if successful upstream firms
bargain with downstream firms before downstream firms make investments. In this situation, there
is no hold-up problem for downstream firms, but vertical integration still affects the investment
incentives of upstream firms. When both upstream firms are successful, the integrated upstream
firm obtains positive profit, whereas the independent upstream firm obtains zero profit. And when
only one upstream firm succeeds, this integrated upstream monopolist is able to obtain a higher
profit, even if the bargaining outcome does not affect downstream investment incentives. This
is because the integrated upstream monopolist holds a stronger bargaining position vis-a-vis the
downstream firms, as it benefits from a better outside option.
Exclusive Dealing. Explicit exclusive dealing contracts can have an impact when there is
bilateral duopoly. If all firms are separated, then exclusive dealing does not change the payoffs
when upstream firms make offers. But when instead downstream firms are the ones making the
offers, both firms asking to be supplied at cost (i.e., a zero price) is no longer an equilibrium if
exclusive dealing offers are allowed. If D2 asks for this, D1 can profitably deviate by making an
exclusive dealing offer with a small positive price /2 to each upstream firm. Both upstream firms
are willing to accept the exclusive dealing offer, and D2 is excluded from the market. D1 gets
profit ∆− , which is higher than the profit δ that it would obtain if it also made non exclusive,
zero price offers. We show in Appendix B that in this case, downstream firms end up with zero
profit.
When UA and D1 integrate, the integrated firm can use exclusive dealing offers to exclude the
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independent upstream firm or the independent downstream firm. As emphasized by Chen and
Riordan (2007), the combination of vertical integration and exclusive dealing can lead to ex post
cartelization. For instance, when it is downstream firms that make offers, the highest price that
D2 can offer UB is δ; whereas UA−D1 can offer UB an exclusive deal with a price δ+ ; this will be
accepted by UB, and D2 is then excluded from the market. UA −D1 gets profit ∆− δ − , which
is higher than when exclusive dealing is not allowed (δ). Therefore, when exclusive dealing is
allowed, upstream crowding-out effect still exists, and vertical integration still affects downstream
investments. Exclusive dealing intensifies downstream competition, however, which contributes to
restore symmetry between upstream and downstream markets.
1.6.2 Upstream Differentiation
In our two benchmark situations, the extreme divergence between the effect of integration
on upstream and downstream investments stems from the assumption of perfect substitution of
inputs. However, the general logic is that upstream competition is more intense than downstream
competition, and upstream firms benefit more from vertical integration.
Maintaining the assumption that upstream inputs are not channel specific, consider a simple
modification of our basic model to incorporate also upstream differentiation: Both upstream and
downstream markets are characterized by a simple Hotelling model, with transportation cost tu
and td respectively. The consumer can be two types: he cares only upstream differentiation or only
downstream differentiation. All firms observe the type of the consumer, and downstream firms
can moreover price discriminate between different types of consumers.14 When downstream firms
purchase from the same supplier, competition for consumers who care only upstream differentiation
leads to zero profit, but each firm gets expected profit δD = td/4 from consumers who care about
downstream differentiation. When they instead purchase from different suppliers, each firm gets
additional profit δU = tu/4 from consumers who care only upstream differentiation.
Therefore, if downstream firms buy from the same upstream firm, each obtains profit δD; if
instead they buy from different upstream firms, each gets profit δD + δU . Thus, δD measures
downstream differentiation whereas δU instead measures upstream differentiation; as before, we
assume that 2(δD + δU) < ∆. We prove the following result in the Appendix:
Proposition 1.8. Vertical integration has a larger impact on investment when innovation matters
14With this modification, all previous analysis remains valid.
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only upstream than when it matters only downstream; and vertical integration has the same impact
only if there is no differentiation downstream.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This proposition generalizes the insights of our benchmark case where there is no upstream dif-
ferentiation, in which vertical integration only affects upstream investments, and not downstream
ones. As made clear in the proof, the intuition is that upstream competition is more intense, and
thus upstream firms benefit more from integration. Only when all differentiation lies upstream is
the effect of vertical integration symmetric on upstream and downstream investments.
1.6.3 Non-Drastic Innovation
We have so far assumed that innovation is “drastic”, in that it is necessary to enter a market.
When innovation is non-drastic, a failed firm is still active in the market, but with a less effective
technology (lower quality and/or higher cost, say).
Consider a slight modification of our framework in which upstream firms invest in order to
improve the quality of the input, and downstream firms invest to improve the quality of the final
product. The original value of the final product is v as given in our main model. We assume
that successful upstream investment can increase the value of the final product by αω, whereas
successful downstream investment further increases this value by (1 − α)ω. Notice that if ω is
relatively small (ω < 3t in our Hotelling interpretation), then the innovation is indeed “non-
drastic”: a downstream firm cannot drive the other one out of the market even if it obtains
both upstream and downstream innovation. When α → 0, we are in the situation where only
downstream innovation matters; and when α→ 1, only upstream innovation matters.
In this case, successful innovation is no longer required to be active in the market. This has
two consequences: first, it changes the bargaining procedure as all firms are present no matter
how many firms are successful. The presence of an inferior competitor constrains the profit that a
successful innovator can extract, but does not qualitatively affect the benefit of better coordina-
tion from integration. Second, downstream investment is subject to weaker appropriation by an
upstream monopolist. This is because successful investment increases the value of outside option
of a downstream firm, which cannot be appropriated by the upstream monopolist. As a result,
the hold-up problem is present mostly for upstream firms. This is consistent with our insight that
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vertical integration has a larger impact at upstream than downstream. It moreover suggests that
firms are more likely to find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma situation.
1.6.4 Information Disclosure by Upstream Firms
In our model, a final product requires both upstream and downstream innovation, but down-
stream innovation does not require any cooperation in the form of information disclosure or actual
delivery of upstream innovation. In this subsection, we relax this assumption and assume that
downstream firms need information about the upstream innovation in order to make successful
investment. We modify the game as follows:
• Upstream Investment Stage. Each Ui makes investment Ei; the outcomes of investments
realize and are observed; if both firms fail, the game ends;
• Information Disclosure Stage. Successful upstream firms decide whether to disclose infor-
mation about this innovation to any downstream firm; the disclosure decision is observed;
• Downstream Investment Stage. Each Dj makes investment ej if it receives information from
an upstream firm; if both firms receive no information or fail, the game ends;
• Bargaining Stage. The successful upstream firm(s) and successful downstream firm(s) bar-
gain over the supply condition; Payments are made and inputs are delivered accordingly;
• Payoff Stage. Final product market realizes and game ends.
Suppose there is a cost K associated with disclosure. Such cost may be the risk of information
leakage, or about how to convey the information correctly to downstream firms. We assume that
when an upstream firm is indifferent between disclosing and not disclosing, it chooses to disclose.
When only one upstream firm is successful, the incentive to disclose may differ depending on
whether it is vertically integrated or not. Under vertical separation, the profit for the upstream
monopolist is piV S if it discloses information to both downstream firms; if it only discloses to one
downstream firm, downstream investment is ∆/2cd, and the profit for the upstream monopolist
is pi1V S = ∆
2/4cd. When the upstream monopolist is vertically integrated, the profit is piV I if it
also discloses the information to the independent downstream firm. When it does not disclose,
downstream investment is given by ∆/cd and the profit for the integrated firm is pi
1
V I = ∆
2/2cd.
Then an integrated upstream monopolist has less incentive to disclose to both downstream firms.
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Proposition 1.9. There exists a range of value K ∈ (K,K) such that an monopolist discloses
information to both downstream firms when it is independent, but does not disclose to the inde-
pendent downstream rival when it is vertically integrated.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The reason is simple: By disclosing information to both downstream firms, the upstream
monopolist may benefit from intensified downstream competition. But an integrated upstream firm
has less to gain from such strategy, as competition also deteriorates the profit of its downstream
affiliate. This leads to a strengthened downstream amplifying effect, as the difference between the
profit of an integrated upstream monopolist and a separated one is even larger for K belonging
to the range in the proposition.
When both upstream firms are successful, under vertical separation, neither upstream firm
has incentive to disclose: as upstream competition drives input price down to zero, no upstream
firm can cover the cost of disclosure if it were to disclose to any downstream firm. Under single
integration, no upstream firm discloses to the independent downstream firm,15 whereas the inte-
grated downstream firm can always get the information from the upstream affiliate (provided that
K ≤ pi1V I). Hence, when both upstream firms succeed, the integrated upstream firm generates
positive benefit from its innovation, whereas the independent upstream firm gets zero profit. This
may further amplify the coordination effect if K is not too large.
1.6.5 Contracting for Innovation–Outsourcing
We have shown that for each pair of upstream and downstream firms, integration is a dominant
strategy in the static game. But when only upstream innovation matters, firms face a prisoner’s
dilemma situation. Hence, when firms interact repeatedly and are patient enough, we can have a
collusive-like equilibrium where all firms remain separated.
However, under vertical separation, when there is only one upstream innovator, downstream
firms have to compete to be the distributor for the upstream monopolist. Then a downstream
firm may want to sign an exclusive contract with an upstream firm, in order to secure the input
if the upstream firm succeeds.
15The independent upstream firm has no incentive to disclose, as it always gets zero profit. The integrated
upstream firm has no incentive to disclose to the independent downstream firm, as this intensifies downstream
competition and lowers its profit.
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We consider a simple form of such contract between, say, D1 and UA: D1 makes an upfront
payment f to UA, and it commits to pay UA additionally p1 if only UA succeeds, and p2 if both
upstream firms succeed; in return, UA only supplies to D1 whenever it succeeds. If D2 makes a
similar offer to UB, which UB accepts, D1’s optimal offer is the solution to:
maxp1,p2 EA(1− EB)(∆− p1) + EAEB(δ − p2)− f,
s.t. EA = maxEAEA(1− EB)pB1 + EAEBpB2 − 12cuE2A; (IC − A)
EB = maxEBEB(1− EA)p1 + EAEBp2 − 12cuE2B; (IC −B)
EA(1− EB)p1 + EAEBp2 − 12cuE2A + f ≥ 12cu( ∆cu+∆)2; (IR− A)
EA(1− EB)(∆− p1) + EAEB(δ − p2)− f ≥ δ( ∆cu+∆)2. (IR− 1)
The first two constraints are the Incentive Compatibility constraints which say that upstream
firms choose their investments optimally; the last two constraints are the Individual Rationality
constraints which require that firms should be better than when they are independent.
Consider a symmetric equilibrium where D1 and D2 make the same offer to UA and UB re-
spectively. When upfront payment is not allowed, i.e., f = 0, for simplicity, consider the case
cu = ∆ = 1, the two IC constraints mean that
EA = EB =
p1
1 + p1 − p2 ,
and the upstream IR constraint (IR-A) requires that
p1 + p2 ≥ 1.
Then downstream firms will make such an offer that p1 + p2 = 1. Substituting this into the
downstream IR constraint (IR-1), it shows that the IR-1 holds with equality. Therefore, with this
optimal contract, downstream firms can achieve the same outcome as if they are all vertically
separated.
Nonetheless, firms can do better if upfront payment is allowed. In this case, it is easy to
check that the profit maximizing investment EA = EB = 1/(3− 2δ) can be achieved by setting
f = 1/8−1/2(3− 2δ)2 and p2 + 2(1− δ)p1 = 1. Therefore, depending on the outsourcing contract
allowed, firms can do as well as vertical separation or even better when only upstream innovation
matters.
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1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study firms’ decision of integration in a vertically related industry where
innovation matters. Vertical integration brings better coordination within the integrated firm,
and boosts its investment incentive both upstream and downstream. However, it is only mutually
beneficial for firms to integrate when innovation is important at both levels, in which case multi-
plication of hold-up problem leads to under-investment, and integration reduces the inefficiency.
When instead innovation only matters at one level, firms prefer to stay vertically separated.
Our analysis provides an explanation for recent developments of the global pharmaceutical
industry, where vertical integration and R&D outsourcing happen at the same time. We show
that a key determinant of these two trends is the relative importance of innovative investment
in the upstream and downstream markets. Vertical integration in the pharmaceutical industry
occurs between biotech firms, where innovation matters both at the research and at the devel-
opment/manufacturing stage; whereas outsourcing takes place for more traditional technologies,
where innovation matters mostly at the upstream research stage.
Our insights suggest that when evaluating the impact of vertical integration, especially in in-
dustries with intensive innovative investments, the exact nature of the interplay between upstream
and downstream investments may be a key point for the decision. Studying the impact of vertical
integration in a more general bargaining environment, or in the presence of other forms of comple-
mentarity might be interesting avenues for future research. In addition, whereas there has been a
number of empirical papers studying the effect of horizontal mergers on innovation, it would also
be valuable to study/test empirically the theory predictions developed in this paper.
1.8 Appendix
Most of the propositions in our analysis can be obtained with generic cost function C(e) such
that: it is increasing and convex, C ′(0) > 0, C ′(1) > ∆, and C ′′(e) > ∆ for all e ∈ [0, 1]. However,
we provide the proofs with quadratic cost functions, which satisfy Assumption 1.
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1.8.1 Appendix A
1.8.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1.1
When only one side innovation matters, at least in one market both firms are active. There are
three cases where the market is viable: upstream monopoly with downstream duopoly; upstream
duopoly with downstream monopoly; and bilateral duopoly.
Case 1: Upstream Monopoly.
Suppose only one upstream firm succeeds, say UA. When UA makes offers to downstream firms,
UA can always guarantee a payoff of ∆. To do so, UA offers (∆, p) with p > ∆ to D1 and D2
respectively, which will be accepted and only D1 purchases from UA.
16
When D1 and D2 make offers to UA, the only equilibrium is that both propose a price ∆, and
UA accepts one of them. To see this, suppose D1 proposes a price p1 and D2 proposes p2. First,
any prices such that 0 < pj ≤ δ cannot be an equilibrium. In this case, UA would accept both
offers, as it would then be a dominant strategy for both Dj to purchase the input. Then each Dj
would deviate to propose a lower price which would still be accepted by UA. Second, pj = 0 cannot
be an equilibrium either. Suppose not, either Dj can propose a price p
′
j = δ + , which leads UA
to only accept the offer of Dj. This gives Dj a profit of ∆− δ − , which is higher than δ. Third,
any offers such that δ < pj < ∆ cannot be an equilibrium. In this case, UA would only accept the
offer with higher price or randomize when both downstream firms offer the same price, then at
least one downstream firm can profitably deviate by increasing price so as to win. Therefore, the
only candidate for equilibrium is that both downstream firms propose ∆. Neither of downstream
firms has incentive to increase price, and reducing price leads UA to accept only the offer of the
other firm.
Hence, when there is only one upstream innovator, it obtains the industry profit ∆.
Case 2: Downstream Monopoly.
Suppose only D1 is successful. Clearly, D1 obtains ∆ when it makes offers. When upstream
firms make offers, they both offer zero is the only equilibrium: any positive offer will be undercut
by the competitor. Therefore, in this case, the downstream monopolist always obtains ∆.
Case 3: Bilateral Duopoly.
When upstream firms make offers to downstream firms, the only equilibrium is that each Ui
16It is a weakly dominant strategy for D2 not to purchase, then to purchase is a best response of D1.
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offers zero price to both downstream firms, and both downstream firm accept both offers and
purchase the input. As each downstream firm only purchases from the firm who offers lower price,
any positive offer would be undercut by the other upstream firm, and thus such offers cannot be
the equilibrium.
When downstream firms make offers, they will ask for zero price to both upstream firms, and
both upstream firms accept both offers. The reason is simple: the only reason that a downstream
firm may offer positive price is that both upstream firms choose to only accept the offer from it.
However, this cannot be part of the equilibrium. As the downstream firm only purchases from
one of them(either from the one with lower price or the preferred one when indifferent), then
at least one upstream firm would accept both offers. As there is no way to exclude the other
downstream firm from the market, each downstream firm cannot do better by just offering zero
prices to upstream firms.
Therefore, when there is bilateral duopoly, upstream firms supply at cost and each downstream
firm obtains δ.
1.8.1.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2
Denote by EU+ and E
U
− the investment of the integrated and the independent upstream firm
respectively, when only upstream innovation matters. Rewrite the best response functions as cuE
U
+ = ∆(1− EU−) + αδEU− ,
cuE
U
− = ∆(1− EU+).
When α = 0, the solution corresponds to the investment under vertical separation; when α = 1, it
is the solution under single vertical integration; and when α ∈ (0, 1), we have partial integration,
where the integrated upstream firm gets a share of the profit of the downstream affiliate. It is
clear to see that
∂EU+
∂α
=
δEU−
cu
,
which is always positive. Therefore, we must have EU+ > EU . Furthermore, we have ∂E
U
−/∂E
U
+ =
−∆ < 0, and thus EU− < EU . Actually, EU+ is increasing in α and EU− is decreasing, and thus
the crowding-out upstream is also increasing in α. The effect of integration on investment is the
largest when the integration is full.
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1.8.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1.3
The joint profit of each pair Ui −Dj when both upstream firms invest E is given by
piUi−Dj = E(1− E)∆ + E2δ − cu
E2
2
,
which is decreasing if
E > E˜ =
∆
cu + 2(∆− δ) .
As in the above proof of Proposition 1.2, the upstream investment under symmetric market
structure (vertical separation or pairwise integration) is determined by
cuE = (1− E)∆ + αδE.
α = 0 corresponds to the case of vertical separation, whereas α = 1 is the case of pairwise
integration. It is easy to see that
∂E
∂α
> 0.
Therefore, the investment under pairwise integration is higher than under vertical separation.
Moreover, when α = 0, we have EU > E˜. Hence, E
PI
U > EU > E˜. Pairwise integration leads to
more over-investment, and the profit of the integrated firm is lower than under vertical separation.
Moreover, the over-investment problem is increasing in α, and thus the over-investment is more
severe under full integration than under partial integration.
1.8.1.4 Proof of Proposition 1.4
The downstream investment is this case is determined by
cde
V S = (1− eV S)∆
2
.
The industry profit is given by
Π = (e1 + e2 − e1e2)∆− cd e
2
1
2
− cd e
2
2
2
,
which is maximized at e∗, given by
cde
∗ = (1− e∗)∆.
Social welfare is given by
W = (e1 + e2 − e1e2)(v − t
2
)− cd e
2
1
2
− cd e
2
2
2
,
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which is maximized at eo, given by
cde
o = (1− eo)(v − t
2
).
Clearly, as ∆/2 < ∆ < v − t/2, we have eV S < e∗ < eo. Hence, downstream investment is
insufficient compared with either industry profit maximizing or welfare maximizing investment.
1.8.1.5 Proof of Proposition 1.5
Denote by eV I+ and e
V I
− the investment of the integrated and the independent downstream firm
respectively, and we can rewrite the best response functions as cde
V I
+ = (1− eV I− )∆2 + α∆2 ,
cde
V I
− = (1− eV I+ )∆2 .
When α = 0, the solution corresponds to the investment under vertical separation, eV S. When
α = 1, the solution is the optimal investment under single integration. Clearly, we have
∂eV I+
∂α
=
∆
2cd
,
which is always positive. Therefore, we must have eV I+ > e
V S; moreover, as ∂eV I− /∂e
V I
+ < 0, we
have eV I− < e
V S.
1.8.1.6 Proof of Lemma 1.2
The benefit for the upstream monopolist when it is vertically separated is
piV S = 2e
V S(1− eV S)∆
2
+ (eV S)2∆ = eV S∆;
and the benefit for an integrated upstream monopolist is
piV I = e
V I
+ ∆ + e
V I
− (1− eV I+ )
∆
2
− cd (e
V I
+ )
2
2
.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 1.5, if α = 0, we have
piV I = e
V S∆ + eV S(1− eV S)∆
2
− cd (e
V S)2
2
,
which is higher than piV S, as the last two terms is the profit for an independent downstream firm,
which is positive (we denote this profit as piDV S). Moreover, we have
∂piV I
∂α
= −∆
2
∂eV I−
∂α
> 0,
as eV I− is decreasing in α. Therefore, we must have piV I > piV S, and the difference is larger for
larger α.
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1.8.1.7 Proof of Proposition 1.6
The best response function for the independent upstream firm is unchanged after integration.
The best response function for the integrated upstream firm is given by
cuE
V I
+ = (1− EV I− )piV I + (piDV I − piDV S)EV I− ,
which can be rewritten as
cuE
V I
+ = (1− EV I− )piV S + α(1− EV I− )(piV I − piV S) + α(piDV I − piDV S)EV I−
When α = 0, this corresponds to the case of vertical separation; and when α = 1, it is the case
of vertical integration. Lemma 1.2 has shown that piV I > piV S; in addition, we can show that
piDV S < pi
D
V I :
piDV S =
1
2
cd(
∆
2cd + ∆
)2,
and
piDV I =
1
2
cd(
∆
cd + ∆− δ )
2.
Clearly we have piDV S < pi
D
V I , as 2cd + ∆ > cd + ∆ − δ. Therefore, we must have ∂EV I+ /∂α > 0;
moreover, we have ∂EV I− /∂E
V I
+ < 0. And hence, it must be the case that E
V I
+ > E
V S > EV I− .
1.8.1.8 Proof of Proposition 1.7
We show in this proof that the joint profit of UA−D1 is higher under pairwise integration than
under vertical separation. Denote EV S and EPI as the upstream investments under vertical sepa-
ration and pairwise integration respectively. The joint profit of UA−D1 under vertical separation
is
piV SUA−D1(E
V S) = (EV S)2 [e2Dδ + eD(1− eD)∆−
1
2
cde
2
D]︸ ︷︷ ︸
piDV I
+EV S(1− EV S)[eV S∆ + eV S(1− eV S)∆− 1
2
cd(e
V S)2 − 1
2
cd(e
V S)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
piindV S
]
−1
2
cu(E
V S)2,
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and the joint profit under pairwise integration is
piPIUA−D1(E
PI) = (EPI)2 [e2Dδ + eD(1− eD)∆−
1
2
cde
2
D]︸ ︷︷ ︸
piDV I
+EPI(1− EPI)[eV I+ ∆ + eV I− (1− eV I+ )∆−
1
2
cd(e
V I
+ )
2 − 1
2
cd(e
V I
− )
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
piindPI
]
−1
2
cu(E
PI)2.
First, we have EV S < EPI , the upstream investments are higher under pairwise integration than
separation. Then, it is easy to check that piindV S < pi
ind
PI , which says that when there is an upstream
monopolist, the industry profit is higher when it is vertically integrated than separated. Thus,
if the investment cost is relatively high, the difference between vertical separation and pairwise
integration is determined by the first order term: EV SpiindV S and E
PIpiindPI . Thus the joint profit is
higher under pairwise integration.
Actually, the intuition holds for all cu, cd ≥ ∆. We have
EV S =
piV S
cu + piV S
,
EPI =
piV I
cu + piV I + piFV I − piDV I
,
where piV S, piV I , pi
F
V I and pi
D
V are as given in the context. We prove for the case where δ = 0 and
∆ = 1.17 We can show that for all cu, cd ≥ 1, the joint profit is higher under pairwise integration
than separation, i.e. piV SUA−D1(E
V S) < piPIUA−D1(E
PI).
1.8.1.9 Proof of Proposition 1.8
In both cases (when only upstream innovation matters or only downstream innovation matters),
if both firms fail in investment, the payoffs for all firms are zero. Similarly, if only one firm succeeds,
it is able to extract the industry profit ∆.
If both firms are successful, then we have bilateral duopoly. The case when it is the downstream
firms who make offers is simple. Each downstream firm asks p = 0 to both upstream firms is an
equilibrium, and each downstream firm gets profit δD + δU . There is no profitable deviation for
either downstream firm. This is because there is no equilibrium such that both upstream firms
17As a result of continuity, the result still holds for relatively small δ. Moreover, as all investments are proportional
to ∆, it is just a normalization to set ∆ equal to 1.
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only accept the offer from the same downstream firm, (as the downstream firm would only buy
from one of them) there is no gain for either downstream firm to propose a positive price.
The situation is more tricky when it is the upstream firms who make offers. To fix idea, we
try to find the symmetric non-discriminatory equilibrium, which is defined in the following way:
denote pij as the offer made by upstream firm Ui, i = A,B to downstream firm Dj, j = 1, 2. A
symmetric non-discriminatory equilibrium is such that pij = p for i = A,B and j = 1, 2.
Notice that each downstream firm can always choose where to buy the input or not to buy at
all, it does not give it any advantage to reject any offer from upstream firms. Therefore, all offers
must be accepted by downstream firms. Moreover, in any such equilibrium, when downstream
firms make purchase decisions, there is no dominant strategy for each downstream firm. This
is because, when upstream inputs are also differentiated, downstream firms would try to avoid
purchasing from the same upstream firm. We assume that the two downstream firms play the
mix-strategy equilibrium where they randomize between purchasing from UA or UB. Moreover,
we assume that when this mix-strategy equilibrium gives negative expected profit to downstream
firms, both downstream firms choose not to purchase.18
Then it is obvious that in any symmetric non-discriminatory equilibrium, we have p ≤ δD + δU/2.
Otherwise, in the mixed strategy equilibrium, each Dj purchases from either upstream firm with
equal probability, which results in an expected profit of δD + δU/2− p < 0. Then either upstream
firm would deviate to a lower price to attract downstream firms. Now we can show that,
Lemma 1.3. The unique symmetric non-discriminatory equilibrium is p = δU if δU ≤ 2δD; and
p = δD + δU/2 if δU > 2δD.
19
Proof. Given that the price offered by UA is pA1 = pA2 = pA, if UB offers pB1 = pB2 = pB, the
downstream firms play the mix strategy in the purchase decision such that each Dj purchases
from UA with probability (δU + pB − pA)/2δU , and purchases from UB with the complementary
probability. And then the profit for UB is
piB =
1
δU
pB(δU + pA − pB),
18By assuming this, we allow downstream firms to coordinate their decision to certain extent; however, this is
not essential for the result. As the expected profit for each downstream firm is zero if not to buy is played with
positive probability in the mixed strategy equilibrium, which is the same if both firms choose to stay out of the
market.
19In the special case with δU = 0, we have p = 0 just as our benchmark model.
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which gives us the best response function of UB
pB =
δU + pA
2
.
Similarly, for UA, we have
pA =
δU + pB
2
.
Then the unique solution is given by pA = pB = δU . However, this leaves the expected profit
of downstream firms as δD − δU/2. Therefore, if δU ≤ 2δD, this is the unique equilibrium. If
δU > 2δD, the upstream price is δD + δU/2 so as to keep downstream firms in the market.
20
Now we can investigate the effect of vertical integration on investment incentives. If δU ≤ 2δD,
when only upstream innovation matters, the payoff matrix is shown Table 1.8.
Table 1.8: Only Upstream Innovation matters
(a) Vertical Separation
HHHHHHHHH
UA
UB
S F
S δU
2
, δU
2
∆,0
F 0,∆ 0,0
→
(b) Vertical Integration
HHHHHHHHH
UA −D1
UB
S F
S δU + δD,
δU
2
∆,0
F 0,∆ 0,0
In the left panel (a), each upstream firm gets profit δU when it is the upstream firms who
make offers to downstream firms, which happens with probability 1/2. Under vertical integration,
the independent upstream firm can still ask for δU from D2, since now inputs are differentiated.
We measure the impact of vertical integration on investment incentives as the relative gain for
the integrated firm when both firms are successful. Then this impact in the case of upstream
innovation is δD + δU/2.
If only downstream innovation matters, the payoff matrix is given by Table 1.9.
20This is so because each upstream firm would want to deviate to a higher price, however such deviating leads
both downstream firms to leave the market.
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Table 1.9: Only Downstream Innovation matters
(a) Vertical Separation
HHHHHHHHH
D1
D2
S F
S δD +
1
4
δU ,δD +
1
4
δU ∆,0
F 0,∆ 0,0
→
(b) Vertical Integration
HHHHHHHHH
D1 − UA
D2
S F
S δU + δD,δD +
δU
2
∆,0
F 0,∆ 0,0
In the left panel, the downstream firms get δU + δD when downstream firms make offers; and
they get δD − δU/2 when upstream firms make offers. And the effect of vertical integration on
downstream investment can be measured by δU/2. Therefore, vertical integration has larger impact
on upstream innovation than on downstream innovation as δD + δU/2 > δU/2. In the special case
where δU = 0 as in our benchmarks, vertical integration only affects upstream investments but
not downstream investments.
Similarly, if δU > 2δD, when only upstream innovation matters, the payoff matrix for the inno-
vating firms is given by Table 1.10, and the impact of vertical integration on upstream investment
is given by δD + δU/2.
Table 1.10: Only Upstream Investment
(a) Vertical Separation
HHHHHHHHH
UA
UB
S F
S δD
2
+ δU
4
, δD
2
+ δU
4
∆,0
F 0,∆ 0,0
→
(b) Vertical Integration
HHHHHHHHH
UA −D1
UB
S F
S δU + δD,
δU
2
∆,0
F 0,∆ 0,0
When only downstream innovation matters, the payoff matrix for the innovating firms is given
by Table 1.11, and the impact of vertical integration on downstream investment is given by δU/2.
Therefore, vertical integration still has larger impact on upstream investment.
1.8.1.10 Proof of Proposition 1.9
It suffices to show that piV S − pi1V S > piV I − pi1V I , which is equivalent to show pi1V I − pi1V S >
piV I − piV S. We have
pi1V I − pi1V S =
∆2
4cd
,
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Table 1.11: Only Downstream Investment
(a) Vertical Separation
HHHHHHHHH
D1
D2
S F
S δD+δU
2
, δD+δU
2
∆,0
F 0,∆ 0,0
→
(b) Vertical Integration
HHHHHHHHH
UA −D1
D2
S F
S δU + δD,δD +
δU
2
∆,0
F 0,∆ 0,0
and
piV I − piV S = ∆
2
(4c2d −∆2)2
(4c3d +
3
2
cd∆
2 − 4c2d∆).
After simplification, we have
(pi1V I − pi1V S)− (piV I − piV S) =
∆2
4cd(4c2d −∆2)2
(16c3d∆ + ∆
4 − 14c2d∆2),
which is always positive since cd > ∆.
Let K = piV I − pi1V I and K¯ = min{piV S − pi1V S, piV S/2}. For K ∈ (K, K¯), which is non-empty,
we have piV S − pi1V S −K > 0, and piV S − 2K > 0, and thus the independent upstream monopolist
discloses to both downstream firms; but piV I−pi1V I−K < 0, so the integrated upstream monopolist
does not disclose to the independent downstream firm.
1.8.2 Appendix B
1.8.2.1 The Case of Exclusive Dealing
We study the pure strategy equilibrium in the bilateral duopoly case when it is the downstream
firms that make offers. Firstly, we show that simple price offers cannot be an equilibrium, and
the equilibrium offers must have exclusive dealing clause. Secondly, we show that there is no
symmetric equilibrium such that OA1 = OB2 and OA2 = OB1, where Oij is the offer made by Dj
to Ui. As before, we make the tie-breaking assumption that when UA is indifferent between the
offers of D1 and D2, it chooses the offer of D1; similarly, UB prefers the offer of D2 when it is
indifferent.
Claim 1: Equilibrium offers must contain exclusive dealing clauses.
We need to show that both downstream firms making simple price offers cannot be an equilib-
rium. As any non-negative offers will be accepted by upstream firms, both downstream firms get
a profit of δ. Hence, we must have pAj + pBj ≤ δ, where pAj and pBj are the offers made by Dj
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to UA and UB respectively. Then Dj′ can profitably deviate by make two exclusive dealing offers
(pAj + /2, E) and (pBj + /2, E) to the two upstream firms respectively. Then both UA and UB
will take the exclusive dealing offer, and the profit for Dj′ is ∆ − pAj − pBj − , which is higher
than δ.(As ∆ > 2δ and pAj + pBj ≤ δ)
Claim 2: There exists no symmetric equilibrium.
Consider a symmetric equilibrium with both exclusive dealing offers, i.e. D1 offers {(p1, E) and
(p2, E)} to UA and UB respectively. Then we must have max{p1, p2} ≤ δ. To see this: it cannot
be the case that both upstream firms accept the offers from the same downstream firm due to our
tie-breaking assumption. And thus each downstream firm must get profit δ, which means that the
offered price cannot be higher than δ. Hence, given that D1 makes such offers, D2 can deviate
by offering {(p1 + /2, E), (p2 + /2, E)}, which will be accepted by both upstream firms and give
D2 a profit of ∆ − p1 − p2 −  > δ − p1. Therefore, there is no symmetric equilibrium with both
exclusive dealing offers. Similar argument also indicates that there is no symmetric equilibrium
where each downstream firm makes an exclusive dealing offer to one upstream firm and a simple
price offer to the other upstream firm.
Thus there are only asymmetric equilibria, and any such equilibrium must have the following
property.
Claim 3: In any equilibrium, one downstream firm is excluded from the market.
If both downstream firms are active in the market, each of them is supplied by one upstream
firm and gets profit δ. And thus, it must be the case that all four prices offered by downstream
firms are no higher than δ, which in turn means that each downstream firm has incentive to overbid
and exclude the other downstream firm as the argument in Claim 2.
Claim 4: In any equilibrium, we must have pAj + pBj = ∆ for the active downstream firm Dj;
and min{pAj, pBj} ≥ δ.
Suppose D1 is active and D2 is excluded from the market. For the first part, if not, D2 can
profitably deviate by offering slightly higher prices to both upstream firms and thus exclude D1.
For the second part, if not, suppose pB1 < δ, then D2 can profitably deviate by offering pB1 +  to
UB.
Therefore, in any pure strategy equilibrium, both downstream firms earn zero profit. And the
industry profit is shared between the two upstream firms. However, pure strategy equilibrium may
fail to exist. For instance, suppose D1 is active in the equilibrium, and D1 offers {(p, E), (∆−p, E)}
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to UA and UB, where δ ≤ p ≤ ∆− δ. Then the best response of D2 is to offer {(p1 ≤ p, ·), (p2 <
∆−p, ·)}. However, given that D2 offers p2 < ∆−p to UB, the best response for D1 is not to offer
∆−p to UB but rather to offer p2 + to UB. To circumvent such circumstances, we can restrict the
price quote to be discrete numbers with equal distance , i.e. prices can only be ∆,∆−,∆−2, ....
Then D1 offers {(p, E), (∆ − p, E)} to UA and UB, and D2 offers {(p, ·), (∆ − p − , ·)} is a pure
strategy equilibrium.
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Chapter 2
Net Neutrality
Quality discrimination plays an important role in a number of markets. In the
context of Internet, content providers are subject to quality discrimination from the
Internet Service Providers. We study the effect of quality discrimination on product
designs in this paper. We show that content providers are biased to choose broader
designs. This reduces product differentiation in the market, and intervention is nec-
essary to achieve efficiency in the content market. The result brings new insights into
the discussion about net neutrality, which mandates equal access to every participant
on the Internet.
2.1 Introduction
The Internet had been working under the non-discrimination regulation, which requires all
contents, sites, and platforms being treated equally. This remained to be the situation until 2005,
when the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) changed the classification of Internet trans-
mission from “telecommunication services”to “information services”, which allows the Internet
Service Providers to “create different tiers of online service. They (ISP) would be able to sell
access to the express lane to deep-pocketed corporations and relegate everyone else to the digi-
tal equivalent of a winding dirt road. Worse still, these gatekeepers would determine who gets
premium treatment and who doesn’t”1.
1Lawrence Lessig and Robert W. McChesney (8 June 2006). “No Tolls on The Internet”, The Washington Post.
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This policy change, backed up and put into practice2 by large Internet Service Providers, has
encountered strong opponent opinions from large content providers such as Google, who has tried
to maintain the non-discrimination regulation regime, i.e. a “neutral”network.3
We study the economic consequence of such policy change on the content market. Specifically,
we analyze the impact on how content providers (hereafter CP ) design their products if Internet
Service Providers (hereafter ISP ) can differentiate the quality of access to the network among
different CP s. We show that without net neutrality regulation, if the ISP lacks the ability to
commit to how each CP would be treated in the network, the CP s are biased to design their
products as broader ones.
To show this, we study the interaction between one ISP and two CP s. The CP s can only
reach consumers through the network of the ISP . A consumer values both the match between
a content and his taste, and the quality of connection when he consumers the content. That is
to say, a consumer’s utility from consuming a content depends on both the design of the content
and how the ISP treats this CP . Building on the concept of “demand rotation”introduced by
Johnson and Myatt (2006), we assume that each CP chooses a design, ranging from the broadest
one which is acceptable for a general public, to the most niche one which is tailored to specific
consumer taste. And the ISP chooses a network, which can be either neutral or discriminatory.
In a neutral network, both CP s are treated equally; whereas in a discriminatory network, the ISP
favors one CP and discriminates against the other one.
If the ISP commits to ex ante to a given network priority rule, the the CP s have an incentive
to choose the efficient design. When instead the ISP cannot commit ex ante to how it will treat
the CP s, then it favors the CP with the broader product. The reason is simple: Broader products
attract more consumers, and favoring these products thus increases the demand more than it
decreases the demand for niche products. Anticipating this, each CP tends to choose a broader
design than its rival so as to avoid being discriminated against. Hence, when the most niche design
is efficient, there is prisoner’s dilemma: the CP s would be better off with niche products, but each
CP has an incentive to design a broader product so as to be favored by the ISP .
2“Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic”, NBC news, 19/10/2007.
3“The broadband carriers should not be permitted to use their market power to discriminate against competing
applications or content. Just as telephone companies are not permitted to tell consumers who they can call or what
they can say, broadband carriers should not be allowed to use their market power to control activity online.”–Guide
to Net Neutrality for Google Users.
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Therefore, without net neutrality, lack of commitment from the ISP can lead to inefficient
design choices, which can significantly reduce production differentiation in the content market.
Enforcing net neutrality endows the ISP the commitment power that it lacks, which can eliminate
such distortion of designs in the content market.
The analysis brings new insight into the economic debate4 on net neutrality, which has so far
focused on issues related to pricing and investment incentives.5 For instance, Economides and
Tag (2012) and Hermalin and Katz (2007) analyzed the pricing of the ISP in a two-sided market
framework; Choi and Kim (2010), Kramer and Wiewiorra (2012), and Bourreau et al (2012)
studied the investment incentives of ISP s and CP s in similar frameworks.
The insight that discrimination in quality can have large impact on product designs applies to
other markets as well, especially to those where the quality of access to consumers is important.
For instance, the shelves in a supermarket differ in their locations and easiness to find, and the
owner is likely to locate broader products on those easy-to-find shelves. Thus if the owner lacks
the ability to commit, the manufacturers may be biased to choose broader products.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we present the model and main results, where
a linear example is also shown; we briefly discuss some extensions and robustness of our results in
section 3; and section 4 concludes. All omitted proofs are given in the appendix.
2.2 The Network/Design Model
2.2.1 The Model
Consider a market with a representative consumer/user(U), a monopolistic Internet Service
Provider(ISP ), and two Content Providers(CP1 and CP2). The CP s distribute their products to
the user through the network of the ISP .6
Consumer The representative consumer values both the content and the quality of connection
in an additive way, and only consumes the product with a higher overall valuation.7 His utility
4Schuett(2010) and Kramer et al (2013) provide thorough surveys of the economic literatures on net neutrality.
5The ISP s invest in the network capacity, and the CP s invest in the qualities of their contents.
6We consider a situation where the network serves as a “bottleneck”for the market, so both the consumer and
the CP s cannot bypass the ISP .
7In other words, the two CP s compete for the consumer.
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function is given by
U = max{v1 + q1, v2 + q2} − p,
where vi is the match value between the consumer and the product of CPi, qi is the connection
quality of CPi, and p is the price charged by the ISP .
The match value vi is randomly drawn from a distribution F (vi, si), where si is the design
chosen by CPi.
8 We assume that given designs s1 and s2, the realizations of v1 and v2 are
independent. The connection qualities are determined by how the ISP arranges the network. In
addition, we normalize the reservation utility of the consumer to zero.
Internet Service Provider The ISP charges a price p for the consumer.9 More importantly, the
ISP can choose how to treat the CP s: The ISP can choose a connection quality q1 = δ ∈ [−∆,∆]
for CP1, and the connection quality of CP2 is q2 = −δ.10 When δ = 0, the ISP chooses a neutral
network where both CP s are treated equally; when δ < 0, the ISP favors CP2; and when δ > 0,
the ISP instead favors CP1.
11
Content Providers Each CP chooses a design s ∈ S = [B,N ] which ranges from the broadest
(B) to the most niche (N). Each design s induces the consumer’s match value v to be distributed
according to F (v; s), with density f(v; s) which is positive everywhere in the support [vs, vs]. We
follow Johnson and Myatt(2006) by assuming that different designs induce demand rotation:
Definition 2.1. (Johnson and Myatt 2006): A local change of s leads to a rotation of F (v; s)
8In the basic model, we consider the case where the match value is the only valuation that the user derives from
the content. The content of CPi may also have an intrinsic value θi that is independent from the match value; in
this sense we consider the case of homogeneous CP s where θ1 = θ2 in the basic model.
9We do not consider the case when the ISP also charge CP s for connection. Since the main focus in this paper
is how the possibility of quality discrimination affects the design on the content market, but not how the ISP sets
prices for the user and CP s. For more references on the price setting of the ISP , see the literatures on two-sided
market.
In a discriminatory network, the ISP may auction out the priority or charge the favored CP in other manners,
we consider this possibility in the next section.
10That is, the connection qualities of the two CP s always sum up to zero. Increasing the connection quality of
one CP necessarily decreases that of the other one. For instance, giving priority to CP1 means CP2 has to wait.
11The consumer may value connection quality in a multiplicative way. For instance, U = max{v1q1, v2q2} − p,
and then we can alternatively assume that if the connection quality of CP1 is 1 + δ, then the connection quality of
CP2 is 1− δ, for δ ∈ [−∆,∆]. However, this does not change our qualitative result.
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if for some v∗s and each v ∈ (vs, vs)
v > v∗s ⇔
∂F (v; s)
∂s
< 0 and v < v∗s ⇔
∂F (v; s)
∂s
> 0.
If this holds for all s, then {F (v; s)} is ordered by a sequence of rotations.
The concept of demand rotation formalizes the idea that some designs induce a wider spread
of consumer valuations than others; for instance, some designs cater to a particular group of
consumers whereas others cater to a more general public. An increase in s leads to a clockwise
rotation of the distribution function around the rotation point v∗s , so there are more consumers
with high valuation, but also more consumers with low valuation. A higher s means a more niche
product, and the bounds on s correspond to the broadest and the most niche product.
We focus on a class of rotation-ordered functions such that v∗s is decreasing in s. As shown
in Johnson and Myatt(2006), with such rotation-ordered functions, the monopoly profit is quasi-
convex in s, and thus maximized at extreme designs.
Assumption 2.1. {F (v; s)} is rotation-ordered in s and the rotation point v∗s is decreasing in s.
Demands and Profits For given designs s1 and s2, network choice δ, and price p, the demand
for CP1 is given by
D1(s1, s2; δ; p) =
∫ ∞
p−δ
F (v + 2δ; s2)dF (v; s1). (2.1)
Similarly, the demand for CP2 is given by
D2(s1, s2; δ; p) =
∫ ∞
p+δ
F (v − 2δ; s1)dF (v; s2). (2.2)
The demand for the ISP service equals the sum of the demands for each CP , which is
D(s1, s2; δ; p) = D1 +D2
= Prob(max{v1 + δ, v2 − δ} ≥ p)
= 1− F (p− δ; s1)F (p+ δ; s2);
(2.3)
Hence the profit of the ISP is
piδ0(s1, s2, p) = p ·D(s1, s2; δ; p).
We assume that each CP can costlessly choose any design s ∈ S, and the marginal cost of
production is zero. Moreover, the CP s do not directly charge the consumer; instead, each CPi
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obtains a profit α from one unit of demand for its product through activities such as advertising.12
Therefore, the profit of each CPi is
piδi (s1, s2, p) = α ·Di(s1, s2; δ; p).
2.2.2 Benchmark: Industry Profit Maximization and Commitment
We start with the situation where the ISP can commit to a network characteristic, where we
show that CP s are induced to choose the industry profit maximizing designs.
2.2.2.1 Industry Profit Maximization
The industry profit is given by
Πδ(s1, s2; p) = pi
δ
0(s1, s2; p) + pi
δ
1(s1, s2; p) + pi
δ
2(s1, s2; p)
= (p+ α)D(s1, s2; δ; p).
It is easy to show that the industry profit is quasi-convex in the designs and we focus on the
situation where both the ISP and CP s are better-off with the most niche products than the
broadest products. Specifically, denote Dδ(s, s′) as the demand for CP1 in a network δ, when
CP1’s design is s and CP2’s design is s
′, and we assume that
Assumption 2.2. piδ0(N,N) > pi
δ
0(B,N) > pi
δ
0(B,B), and D
δ(N, s) > Dδ(B, s) for δ ∈ [−∆,∆]
and s ∈ S.13
Then it is straightforward to show that:
Proposition 2.1. Under Assumptions 1,2, the industry profit is maximized when both CP s choose
the most niche design.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.1.
12The result in this paper is not sensitive to this assumption. We can readily make other assumptions on how
CP s generate profits. For instance, the ISP and each CP may share the profit that is generated from the demand
for the product of the CP , which is the situation in the pay-TV market.
And we briefly discuss the more general case where CP s differentiate in their profitability in section 3.
13The price is set at the profit-maximizing level by the ISP , given the network and designs chosen by CP s.
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2.2.2.2 Commitment
When the ISP commits to a network characteristic δ, the game goes as follows:
• Stage 0: The ISP announces a network choice δ ∈ [−∆,∆];
• Stage 1: The two CP s choose their designs, s1 and s2, simultaneously;
• Stage 2: The ISP sets the price p;
• Stage 3: The consumer observes both match values v1, v2, network characteristic δ and price
p, then decides whether to connect to the service and which content to consume.
Notice that in the commitment case, the ISP only commits to a network characteristic δ, but
not to a price p. Hence, the optimal price depends on the designs chosen by the CP s, which we
denote as pˆ(s1, s2). And we make the following assumption to facilitate our analysis:
Assumption 2.3. |∂Di
∂si
| > |∂Dj
∂si
|,for j 6= i; and |∂Di
∂si
| > |∂Di
∂p
∂pˆ
∂si
|.14
The first part of Assumption 2.3 says that for each CP , keeping the price fixed, changing its
product design has a larger impact on its own demand than on the demand of the other CP .15
The second part of the Assumption says that the indirect effect on demand resulting from the
induced change in price is dominated by the direct effect following a change in design. Now we
can show the following result:
Proposition 2.2. Under Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3, if F (v; s) is log-concave in v, when the ISP
can commit to a network characteristic, it commits to δ ∈ {−∆,∆}, and both CP s choose the
most niche design.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.3
So, the ISP always commit to a maximally discriminatory network, and the CP s choose the
“efficient”designs that maximize industry profit. The reason (which is shown in detail in the
proof) is as follows: Given the network characteristic, under Assumption 2.3, each CP ’s profit is
14A detailed assumption on the demand function is given in the appendix.
15Similar assumptions are widely made in industry organization literatures. For example, in Bertrand competition
with differentiated goods, we usually assume that the demand for a seller is more sensitive to his own price than
to the rival’s price.
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quasi-convex in its own design and thus maximized at either B or N ; and Assumption 2.2 implies
that each CP prefers to choose N . Moreover, given that both CP s choose the same design,
introducing discrimination increases the demand for the favored CP and decreases the demand
for the discriminated CP . The log-concavity assumption ensures that the first effect dominates
and the overall demand increases. Therefore, the ISP prefers a discriminatory network. And we
assume that in this situation the ISP randomly favors one of the CP s.
2.2.3 No Commitment
Now we turn to the situation when the ISP cannot commit, the CP s have to choose their
designs before the ISP makes any arrangement for the network. The game proceeds as follows:
• Stage 1: The two CP s choose their designs, s1 and s2, simultaneously;
• Stage 2: The ISP sets the price p and chooses whether to discriminate, i.e. chooses a
network characteristic δ;
• Stage 3: The consumer observes both match values v1, v2, network characteristic δ, and
price p, then decides whether to connect to the service and which content to consume.
We solve the game backwards.
At Stage 3, the consumer’s behavior is given by the demand function specified above: he only
consumes the content with higher overall value if it is greater than the price. We study the ISP
and CP ’s behavior in the following.
2.2.3.1 Stage 2: ISP ’s Behavior
For the ISP , two decisions have to be made: what price to charge for the consumer and
whether to discriminate any of the CP s. The above Proposition 2.2 has shown that when the two
CP s choose the same design s, the ISP will choose a network with maximum discrimination.
The logic also extends to the situation when the two CP s chooses different designs, say CP1
chooses a product which is broader than that of CP2, i.e. s1 < s2, then we have the following
result:
Proposition 2.3. When the designs of the two CP s are different, if F (v; s) is log-concave in v
and s, the ISP will maximally favor the CP with broader design.
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Proof. See Appendix 2.5.4.
The reason why the ISP always favors the broader product is simple. For a given price,
choosing a discriminatory network shifts down the distribution function of match value for the
favored CP , and shifts up that for the discriminated one. The assumption on F (v; s) ensures
that the downward-shift is larger when the broader product is favored and thus demand increases
more. Simply speaking, improving the quality of a product that suits more consumers leads to a
larger increase in demand than improving the quality of a product which is popular only among
a small group of consumers.
Then the problem for the ISP is simply to choose a price to maximize profit under a network
with maximum discrimination which favors the broader product. That is to say, for any s1 ≤ s2,16
ISP ’s Problem: maxppi
∆
0 (s1, s2; p) = p · (1− F (p−∆; s1)F (p+ ∆; s2)).
2.2.3.2 Stage 1: CP s’ Behavior
When the ISP lacks the ability to commit, the CP s have to make their decisions anticipating
how they would be treated ex post. Denote D(B,B) as the demand for each CP when they both
choose the broadest design.17 The following proposition shows that both CP s choosing the most
niche design is no longer an equilibrium, and they are biased to choose broader designs.
Proposition 2.4. Under Assumption 2.2 and 2.3, and F (v; s) is log-concave in both s and v, when
the ISP cannot commit to a network, (B,B) is the only equilibrium if D(B,B) > D−∆(N,B);
and there is no pure strategy equilibrium if D(B,B) < D−∆(N,B).
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.5.
The intuition for this results is simple: when the ISP cannot commit to a network, under the
assumption that F (v; s) is log-concave in s and v, it is equivalent to say that the ISP commits
to favor the broader product ex post, and therefore each CP is biased to choose broader designs
in order to gain competitive advantage.
When the most niche design is the “efficient”choice for the CP , without uncertainty about the
network, each CP can maximize his own profit without considering the design of the other CP .
16This is the case subject to a relabeling of the two content providers.
17We have D(B,B) = D
1(B,B)+D2(B,B)
2 .
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When such uncertainty prevails, on one hand, each CP intends to choose a more niche design so
as to increase his profit; on the other hand, each CP is inclined to choose a broader design so
as not to be discriminated against ex post. The lack of commitment from the ISP creates such
strategic concerns, which biases the CP s’ choices to broader designs.
Remark When pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist, there exist mixed strategy equilibrium,
where each CP randomizes among different designs. Nevertheless, more broader products would
emerge in such equilibrium and the result of broad-biased design still holds.
2.2.4 An Example
We consider a linear example with the characteristic that the rotation point is fixed, which
enables us to show explicitly how lack of commitment from the ISP could distort the product
designs in the content market.
Take the symmetric case θ1 = θ2 = θ; and the match value vs for a design s follows a uniform
distribution on the interval [−s, s]. Thus, for each design s, the user valuation follows a uniform
distribution on [θ−s, θ+s], and the rotation point is θ for any design s. We assume that the design
s ∈ S = [s, s], where s = s is the most broad design and the user valuation is more concentrated
around θ; and s = s is the most niche design, the user may get very high or very low value.
In this linear case, we have F (v; s) = v+s−θ
2s
and f(v; s) = 1
2s
, and thus
f
F
(s, v) =
1
v + s− θ ,
which is indeed decreasing in both s and v. Therefore, if s1 < s2, and the corresponding optimal
price is such that f(v; s1) is positive, the ISP prefers to give better connection to CP1; explicitly,
at such price, the demand in a network favoring CP1 is
D1 = 1− p+ s1 − δ − θ
2s1
·p+ s2 + δ − θ
2s2
.
The demand in a neutral network and a network favoring CP2 is
DN = 1− p+ s1 − θ
2s1
·p+ s2 − θ
2s2
and D2 = 1− p+ s1 + δ − θ
2s1
·p+ s2 − δ − θ
2s2
.
Then it is easy to see that D1 > DN and D1 > D2.
Therefore, if the two CP s choose the same design s, the ISP would choose a discriminatory
network which randomly favors either one of the two CP s. The profit is then
Π = p(1− p+ s− θ − δ
2s
p+ s− θ + δ
2s
),
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then the optimal price is
p∗ =
−(2s− 2θ) +
√
(2s− 2θ)2 + 12s2 − 3(s− θ − δ)(s− θ + δ)
3
.
Thus for a given δ, we have
p∗ > θ + δ if s > sˆ,
where sˆ = 2
3
θ if δ = 0; and sˆ increases with δ. We focus on the case where s ≥ sˆ, so that when s1
and s2 are greater than sˆ, the optimal price is above the higher rotation point θ+ δ; and thus the
industry profit is increasing in si and attains maximum at si = s.
Then we need to check if Assumption 2 is satisfied, which is equivalent to check that if increasing
si can increase the profit of the ISP , then it also increases the profit of CPi. In this linear example,
when s ≥ sˆ, it is clear that the profit of the ISP is increasing in si. Moreover, increasing si also
increases the demand for CPi. Take CP1 for example, if s1 < s2, the ISP chooses a network
favoring CP1,
D1 =
∫ θ+s1
p−δ
F (s2, v + 2δ)dF (s1, v),
and
D2 =
∫ θ+s2
p+δ
F (s1, v − 2δ)dF (s2, v).
Note that, for a given price p, we can see D1 as a weighted summation of F (v; s2), increasing s1
leads to a clockwise rotation of F (v; s1), this rotation shifts more weight to higher v, and thus
more weight on higher F (v; s2). Similarly, for D2, it’s a weighted summation over F (v; s1), an
increase in S1 lowers the value of F (v; s1) for each v, and thus lower the demand D2. Thus, we
must have ∂D1
∂s1
> 0 > ∂D2
∂s1
; moreover, as ∂D
∂s1
> 0, we have |∂D1
∂s1
| > |∂D2
∂s1
|. Tedious algebra also
shows that if ∂D1
∂s1
> 0, then ∂pi1
∂s1
> 0, and vise versa. Hence, Assumption 2 is satisfied in the
relevant range we consider.
Therefore, in this linear example, the equilibrium must be extreme ones. Specifically, if the
ISP can commit to a network, either neutral or discriminatory, as the profit for each CP increases
with more niche designs, (s, s) is the only equilibrium.
However, with limited commitment, (s, s) cannot be an equilibrium. And there exists a thresh-
old s˜ > s such that for s < s˜, D(s, s) > Ds(s, s). So for s < s˜, (s, s) is the only equilibrium.
Moreover in this linear example, it is easy to show that the socially efficient designs and network
are the most niche designs with a discriminatory network. Thus if the ISP is able to commit, the
social optimal designs can be achieved; if not, the social optimal designs are never obtained.
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2.3 Discussion and Extension
2.3.1 Bidding for Connection Quality
In the model above, we assume that the ISP does not charge the CP for better connection. If
the ISP can auction out the higher connection quality q, will this change the results? To see this,
suppose s1 < s2, so CP1 is favored by the ISP if there is no auction. For a given discriminatory
policy δ 6= 0, denote D1i and p1 as the demand for product CPi and price charged by ISP when
CP1 is favored; similarly D
2
i and p
2 as the demand and price when CP2 is favored. Then the
maximum amount CPi, (i = 1, 2) is willing to bid for high connection quality is
b1 = α(D
1
1 −D21) and b2 = α(D22 −D12).
Thus, CP2 cannot outbid CP1 if D
1
1 +D
1
2 > D
2
1 +D
2
2, which is satisfied.
Proposition 2.5. When the ISP auctions out the high connection quality, if F (v; s) is log-concave
in both s and v, the broader CP outbids the other one. And if a pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium
exists, it must be that both CP s choose the broadest design.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.6.
Therefore, even we allow the CP s to bid for better connection quality, the CP with the more
niche design cannot outbid the broader one; and the bias towards broader designs still exists.
However, this result may change if there is a large difference in the profitabilities of CP s. Suppose
CPi generates profit αi for each unit of demand Di, then the maximum amount CPi is willing to
bid for high connection quality is
bi = αi(D
i
i −Dji ), j 6= i
For CP2 to win the auction and the ISP chooses the network that favors CP2, we need
α2(D
2
2 −D12) > α1(D11 −D21) (CP2 wins),
p2(D21 +D
2
2) + α2(D
2
2 −D12) > p1(D11 +D12) + α1(D11 −D21) (ISP favors CP2).
When α2 is larger enough compared to α1, CP2 may outbid CP1 and ISP may actually choose
to discriminate the broader product. Thus, if there is systematic difference in the profitability of
broad CP and niche CP , the CP s may instead tend to choose niche products.18
18For example, this may be the case if consumers with higher valuation for the product also create higher profit for
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2.3.2 Non-Competing Content Providers
Up to now, we have focused on the case when the two CP s compete for the user in the sense
that the user only consumes the product with higher realized match value. In this subsection,
we briefly discuss the case when the CP s do not directly compete for the user, i.e. the user can
potentially consume both products. For simplicity, we assume that the utility of the consumer is
given by
U = max{v1 + q1, v2 + q2, v1 + q1 + v2 + q2} − p,
implying that the demand is
D(s1, s2; q1, q2; p) = Prob(max{v1 + q1, v2 + q2, v1 + q1 + v2 + q2} > p).
Suppose s1 < s2, we show that the ISP still favors the broader CP1 under a slightly stronger
assumption than the previous section.
Proposition 2.6. When the content providers do not compete for the user, if f(v; s) is log-concave
in both s and v, then the ISP maximally favors the broader product. And therefore, if a pure-
strategy symmetric equilibrium exists, it must be that both CP s choose the broadest design.
Proof. See Appendix 2.5.7.
The result of broad-biased design in the previous section still holds when the two CP s do not
directly compete for the user. The intuition remains the same: an increase in the connection
quality of a broader product leads to a larger increase in demand than a niche product, as the
valuation of the user is more concentrated around the center.
2.3.3 Asymmetric Content Providers
In the previous section, we studied the case of symmetric content providers, i.e. the intrinsic
value of CPi is the same for i = 1, 2; and the user valuations only differ in the match value. When
the two CP s are asymmetric in the sense that one CP has a higher intrinsic value, the result of
favoring the broader CP may be weakened.
Denote the two CP s as CPL and CPH , CPi has an intrinsic value to the user θi, we suppose
θL < θH . The user’s valuation for the product of CPi consists of three parts: the intrinsic value
the CP in the advertising market. In this case, the niche product catering to particular high valuation consumers
may indeed obtain higher profit than a broader product.
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θi, the match value vi, and the connection quality qi. Following the model of competing CP s in
section 3, for a given price p, the demand for the service of the ISP becomes
D = 1− F (p− θL − qL; sL)F (p− θH − qH ; sH).
If sL = sH = s, the effect of favoring CPH in a discriminatory network δ on the demand is
∂DH
∂δ
= f(p− δ − θH ; s)F (p+ δ − θL; s)− f(p+ δ − θL; s)F (p− δ − θH ; s). (2.4)
Thus
sign
∂DH
∂δ
= sign{ f(p− δ − θH ; s)
F (p− δ − θH ; s) −
f(p+ δ − θL; s)
F (p+ δ − θL; s)}.
Clearly, under the assumption that f
F
is decreasing in v, ∂D
H
∂δ
> 0. Therefore, if the two CP s have
the same design, the ISP strictly prefer to favor the CP with higher intrinsic value; furthermore,
even if CPH has a more niche design sH > sL, the ISP still prefers to favor CPH as long as θH is
large enough compared to θL.
The reason why the ISP would prefer favoring the more valuable CP to favoring the CP with
broader design is simple. When the two CP s compete for the user, CPH has a larger chance of
winning; and the price is closer to θH . Thus by giving CPH a better connection quality, the ISP
is able to charge a higher price for the user.
Moreover, with asymmetric CP s, the high-value CP will generally chooses a broader design
than the low-value one. The reason is quite obvious: when the two CP s compete for the user,
the ISP would charge a price which is closer to θH ; then the low-value CPL has to choose a more
niche design so that there is a larger chance that the user will generate high match value from
the low intrinsic value product. If CPL chooses a broad product, it may happen that the product
never deliver high enough utility to the user in order to compete with CPH . For instance, in the
linear example above, if θL < θH−2δ, the rotation point for CPL is always lower than the rotation
point of CPH . Hence, if the two CP s choose different designs, it must be the high value CPH
that chooses the broader product. This observation is consistent with the result of Bar-Isaac et
al(2012), where they show that high valuation firms choose broad design and low valuation firms
choose niche design in a search model.
2.3.4 Competing ISPs
The results above are derived in the situation with a monopolistic ISP , and the results still
hold under the presence of competition in the ISP market as long as consumers are not hugely
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differentiated in their tastes. In the simplest scenario, two ISP s locate at the end points of a
Hotelling line, and consumers are uniformly distributed along the line. If consumers are only
differentiated in their location, each ISP would still favor the CP with broader product, because
any other network would reduce the utility a consumer would generate from connecting to his
service.
When consumers are highly differentiated in their tastes, for example, some consumers strongly
prefer the product of CP1 while the others strongly prefer that of CP2, then each ISP would have
incentive to differentiate himself from the other. In this case, we may have each ISP favors a
different CP and each CP chooses his design without distortion.
2.3.5 Investments of CP s
So far, we have been focusing on the situation where there is no cost for CP s to choose any
design, nor is there any cost for them to enter the market. Now suppose that each CP has to pay
a fixed cost E to enter the market.19
When the ISP cannot commit to a network characteristic, we focus on the case of D(B,B) >
D−∆(N,B), so (B,B) is the only equilibrium if both CP s chose to enter. And thus, if E ≤
αD(B,B), both CP s choose to enter with the broadest design.
When the ISP can commit to a network characteristic δ ≥ 0,20 if a CP decides to enter,
it must choose to enter with the most niche product. However, if the profit of the CP2, who
is discriminated against, is not enough to cover the entry cost, then it won’t enter. That is, if
E ≥ D−δ(N,N), only one CP enters under network characteristic δ. Hence, the ISP may want
to commit to a less discriminatory network so as to induce both CP s to enter, which is beneficial
for both consumers and the ISP . In the situation where the ISP is constrained in the networks
that it can choose, it may be that when the ISP can commit, it commits to a neutral network.
For instance, when the ISP can only choose a neutral network and a network with maximal
19In other words, the entry cost does not depend on the design chosen by the CP . Therefore, Assumption 2.2 is
still verified in this situation. However, we can also assume that the entry cost is increasing in the design chosen
(as it demands more information to design a niche product), and the analysis goes through as long as Assumption
2.2 is satisfied.
20That is, the ISP either chooses a neutral network or a network favoring CP1. And this is the situation only
subject to a relabeling of CP s.
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discrimination,21 if the profit of the discriminated CP is too low, then the ISP prefers to commit
to the neutral network.
2.4 Concluding Remarks on Net Neutrality
In this paper we studied a simple model where the Internet Service Provider and content
providers interact. The main result shows that if the ISP cannot commit to a network structure,
the CP s are biased to choose broader designs. In some circumstances such as our linear example,
such biases take an extreme form. The social optimal designs are achieved with commitment, while
they are never achieved with limited commitment. The underlying reason is simple, with limited
commitment, ex post the ISP prefers a network which favors the broader product; and thus each
CP is inclined to design its product as broader ones in fear that it might be discriminated against
ex post.
This raises the concerns about the effect of net neutrality regulation if we take into account
such impact it may have on the content market. Enforcing such regulation may reduce the biases
on the designs of products, but it may also increase the biases on the network structure in case
where a discriminatory network may be socially beneficial. Abandoning such regulation may not
do much harm if the ISP is able to commit. However, if the ISP behaves opportunistically, the
content markets may end up with many similar products, which the consumers like but don’t love.
Especially, this may be the case in emerging content markets, where content providers are less
differentiated and there is a larger chance that the ISP would be opportunistic.
Although this paper proceeds in the framework of net neutrality, we believe the intuition
that lack of commitment may have serious consequences on the upstream designs works in other
environments also. For instance, a search engine is more likely to put a link which everybody may
click at a higher click-through rate position rather than a link which only a few consumers might
be interested in; a supermarket is likely to put a product that most consumers like at an easy-to-
find shelf rather than a product that attracts only consumers with special tastes. The key insight
is that if the downstream resource owner can potentially practice certain forms of discrimination,
lack of commitment may seriously distort upstream investments.
21This would be the case where one CP gets priority, and the other CP has to wait.
68
2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
To prove proposition 1, we start with the following lemma:
Lemma 2.1. Under Assumption 1, the industry profit is quasi-convex in the designs and thus
maximized at extreme designs.
Proof. The result follows immediately from proposition 1 of Johnson and Myatt(2006). First, it
is obvious that F (v; s) is rotation-ordered implies that F (v; s1)F (v; s2) is rotation-ordered in both
s1 and s2. Then with a given network characteristic δ, for any designs s1 < s2,
22 suppose the price
that maximizes Πδ is above the highest rotation point, i.e. p∗ > v∗s1 , so that the profit maximizing
quantity is below 1−F (v∗s1 ; s1) ·F (v∗s1 ; s2), then by the definition of rotation-ordering, an increase
in either s1 or s2 would shift down F (v
∗
s1
; s1, ·F (v∗s1 ; s2) as both v∗si are decreasing in si, and thus
demand increases even if the price is unchanged. Therefore a higher si always leads to higher
profit. Similarly, if p∗ < v∗s2 , decreasing both s1 and s2 would increase demand when price is fixed.
If v∗s2 < p
∗ < v∗s1 , increasing s2 and decreasing s1 at the same time would increase profit. Thus
the profit maximizing designs must be extreme ones.
Then by Assumption 2.2, both the ISP and CP s prefer the most niche design to the broadest
design, so we have the industry profit is maximized with the most niche designs.
2.5.2 Details of Assumption 2.3
Assumption 2.3 can be obtained from two assumptions on the demand function D(s1, s2; p)
and Di(s1, s2; p).
• (2.1) ∂2D
∂P 2
≤ 0 and |∂D
∂p
| > p|∂2D
∂p2
| for any p;
• (2.2) |∂Di/∂si||∂Di/∂p| ≥ 12
|∂2D/∂p∂si|
|∂2D/∂p2| ≥ |∂Dj/∂si||∂Dj/∂p| ;
We need to show that the above two conditions imply that sign{∂pii/∂si} = sign{∂Di/∂si}.
First, we have
∂pii
∂si
= α[
∂Di
∂si
+
∂Di
∂p
∂p
∂si
]
22Without loss of generality, we suppose s1 < s2, so that v
∗
s1 > v
∗
s2 .
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then what we need to show is simply
|∂Di
∂si
| ≥ |∂Di
∂p
∂p
∂si
|
The profit maximization problem for the ISP gives us the following first order condition
D(s1, s2; p) + p(s1, s2)
∂D(s1, s2; p)
∂p(s1, s2)
= 0
and thus we have
∂p
∂si
= −
∂D
∂si
+ p ∂
2D
∂p∂si
2∂D
∂p
+ p∂
2D
∂p2
Thus we need to show that
|∂D
∂si
+ p ∂
2D
∂p∂si
|
|2∂D
∂p
+ p∂
2D
∂p2
| ≤
|∂Di
∂si
|
|∂Di
∂p
|
From (2.1) we have
|∂D
∂si
+ p ∂
2D
∂p∂si
|
|2∂D
∂p
+ p∂
2D
∂p2
| ≤
|∂D
∂si
|+ p| ∂2D
∂p∂si
|
2|∂D
∂p
|+ p|∂2D
∂p2
| ≤
|∂D
∂si
|+ p| ∂2D
∂p∂si
|
|∂D
∂p
|+ 2p|∂2D
∂p2
| ≤
|∂Di
∂si
|+ |∂Dj
∂si
|+ p| ∂2D
∂p∂si
|
|∂Di
∂p
|+ |∂Dj
∂p
|+ 2p|∂2D
∂p2
|
The right hand side of the above equation is smaller than |∂Di
∂si
|/|∂Di
∂p
| if
|∂Dj
∂si
|+ p| ∂2D
∂p∂si
|
|∂Dj
∂p
|+ 2p|∂2D
∂p2
| ≤
|∂Di
∂si
|
|∂Di
∂p
|
which is implied by (2.2), as
|∂Dj
∂si
|+ p| ∂2D
∂p∂si
|
|∂Dj
∂p
|+ 2p|∂2D
∂p2
| ≤
1
2
| ∂2D
∂p∂si
|
|∂2D
∂p2
| ≤
|∂Di
∂si
|
|∂Di
∂p
|
2.5.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2
We first show that given the network characteristic δ and the design chosen by CPj, sj, the
profit of CPi is quasi-convex in si and thus maximized at one of the extreme designs, i.e. si ∈
{B,N}.
Lemma 2.2. If Assumption 2.3 is satisfied, then for i ∈ {1, 2}, sign{∂piδ0/∂si} = sign{∂piδi /∂si}
for a given network characteristic δ ∈ [−∆,∆].
Proof. It suffices to show that sign{∂piδ0/∂si} = sign{∂Dδi /∂si}. First, we have
piδ0(si, sj) = p(si, sj)D(si, sj; δ; p(si, sj))
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Envelop theorem immediately implies that
∂piδ0
∂si
= p
∂D
∂si
= p(
∂Di
∂si
+
∂Dj
∂si
)
From assumption 2, |∂Di/∂si| > |∂Dj/∂si|,for j 6= i.
If ∂piδ0/∂si > 0, then either ∂Di/∂si > ∂Dj/∂si > 0 or ∂Di/∂si > 0 > ∂Dj/∂si. So we must
have ∂Di/∂si > 0. Similarly, if ∂pi
δ
0/∂si < 0, we must have ∂Di/∂si < 0.
Therefore, under Assumption 2.3, for a given network characteristic δ, changing si changes the
profit of the ISP and CPi in the same direction, and thus both are quasi-convex and maximized
at extreme designs.
Moreover, Assumption 2.2 says that the profit of CPi is higher when it chooses the most niche
rather than the broadest design. Hence, given the network characteristic δ, each CP prefers to
choose N .
Then the ISP chooses δ so as to maximize its profit, given that both CP s will choose the most
niche design. And the following lemma shows that the ISP will choose to maximally favor one of
the CP s.
Lemma 2.3. If F (v; s) is log-concave in v, and both CP s choose the same design s, the ISP will
choose a network with maximum discrimination δ ∈ {−∆,∆}.
Proof. The profit function of the ISP is given by
piδ0 = p · [1− F (p− δ; s)F (p+ δ; s)] (2.5)
Keeping p fixed, differentiating with respect to δ yields
∂piδ0(δ)
∂δ
= p(f(p− δ; s)F (p+ δ; s)− f(p+ δ; s)F (p− δ; s)). (2.6)
Therefore, ∂piδ0(δ)/∂δ = 0 at δ = 0; and ∂pi
δ
0(δ)/∂δ > 0 for any δ ∈ [−∆,∆] if
f
F
(p− δ; s) > f
F
(p+ δ; s),
which is satisfied if F (v; s) is log-concave in v.
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2.5.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3
If s1 < s2, we first show the profit is higher when the ISP favors CP1 than when it chooses a
neutral network. The profit of the ISP is
piδ0 = p(1− F (p− δ; s1)F (p+ δ; s2))
If δ = 0, the network is neutral; if δ > 0, the ISP favors CP1. Fix p, take FOC w.r.t. δ,
∂piδ0
∂δ
= p(f(p− δ; s1)F (p+ δ; s2)− f(p+ δ; s2)F (p− δ; s1))
sign{∂pi
δ
0
∂δ
} = sign{ f
F
(p− δ; s1)− f
F
(p+ δ; s2)}
If F (v; s) is log-concave in s and v, we have
f
F
(p− δ; s1) > f
F
(p− δ; s2) > f
F
(p+ δ; s2) for all δ ∈ [0,∆]
Thus, we have ∂piδ0/∂δ > 0 for all δ ∈ [0,∆]. Therefore, the ISP prefers a maximum discriminatory
network which favors CP1 to a neutral network.
Then we show that a discriminatory network favoring CP1 is preferred to a network favoring
CP2. It suffices to show that for a given p and δ ≥ 0,
F (p− δ; s1)F (p+ δ; s2) < F (p+ δ; s1)F (p− δ; s2)
which is equivalent to
F (p− δ; s1)
F (p− δ; s2) <
F (p+ δ; s1)
F (p+ δ; s2)
which in turn is satisfied if F (x; s1)/F (x; s2) is increasing in x,
sign{
∂ F (x;s1)
F (x;s2)
∂x
} = sign{ f
F
(x; s1)− f
F
(x; s2)}
as F (v; s) is log-concave in s, we have f/F (x; s1) > f/F (x; s2). Thus, favoring CP1 is better for
the ISP than favoring CP2.
2.5.5 Proof of Proposition 2.4
It is easy to show that (N,N) is not an equilibrium anymore. Suppose not, at s1 = s2 = N ,
the ISP will randomly favor one of the two CP s. Then by choosing a design slightly broader
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s′i = N − , CPi induces a negligible change in the price charged by the ISP and the total
demand from the consumer; however, this slight change of design induces the ISP to favor CPi
with probability 1, and thus CPi can get a larger share of the demand. Therefore this constitutes
a profitable deviation for CPi. The same logic implies that any s1 = s2 6= B cannot be an
equilibrium.
Moreover, any B < s1 < s2 < N cannot be an equilibrium. Suppose not, CP2 would be
discriminated against by the ISP . Lemma 2.2 implies that the profit of CP2 is quasi-convex in s2
on the interval (s1, N ], and thus maximized either at s2 = N or s2→s1. In the former case, CP2
has a profitable deviation to N . And in the latter case, CP2 has a profitable deviation to s2 = s1,
as this would induce the ISP to favor CP2 with probability 0.5.
Therefore, if the two CP s choose different designs, the one with the more niche design must
be choosing the most niche design. Suppose CP2 chooses N , then the profit of CP1 is quasi-
convex in s1 on the interval [B,N), where CP1 is favored by the ISP . By Assumption 2.2,
Dδ(N,B) > Dδ(B,B) for any δ, and thus CP1 would choose s1 → N , in which case there is no
pure-strategy equilibrium. Hence, (B,N) cannot be an equilibrium.
Thus, the only candidate for pure-strategy equilibrium is (B,B). If both CP s choose the
broadest design, each CP is favored by the ISP with the same probability; any CP deviating to
a more niche design will be discriminated against for sure. Hence, the deviating CP ’s profit is
quasi-convex on the interval s ∈ (B,N ]. By Assumption 2.2, the profit is maximized at N . Thus, if
D(B,B) < D−∆(N,B), such deviation is profitable, and then no pure strategy equilibrium exists;
on the contrary, if D(B,B) > D−∆(N,B), there is no profitable deviation and (B,B) constitutes
the only equilibrium.
2.5.6 Proof of Proposition 2.5
Given s1 and s2, the profit of the ISP is given by
piδ0 = p(1− F (p− δ; s1)F (p+ δ; s2))
Envelop theorem implies that
∂piδ0
∂δ
= p
∂Dδ
∂δ
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where Dδ = 1−F (p− δ; s1)F (p+ δ; s2), under the assumption that F (v; s) is log-concave in s and
v, Proposition 2.3 has shown that
∂piδ0
∂δ
= p
∂D(δ)
∂δ
> 0
so the demand is higher in a network which favors the broader product CP1.
2.5.7 Proof of Proposition 2.6
First, we show that if f(v; s) is log-concave in s and v, then F (v; s) is also log-concave in s
and v. And therefore the condition in the proposition is stronger than that in the main model.
Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) shows that if the p.d.f f(x) is log-concave, then the c.d.f. F (x) is
also log-concave, which proves the “log-concave in v”part. If f(v; s) is log-concave in s, then it is
easy to show that f(v; s1)/f(v; s2) is increasing in v for s1 < s2. Moreover, we have
f(v; s1)
F (v; s1)
− f(v; s2)
F (v; s2)
=
∫ v
−∞(f(v; s1)f(x; s2)− f(v; s2)f(x; s1))dx
F (v; s1)F (v; s2)
as f(v; s1)/f(v; s2) > f(x; s1)/f(x; s2) for any x < v, we must have f(v; s1)/F (v; s1) > f(v; s2)/F (v; s2).
So F (v; s) is also log-concave in s.
For a given price p, the user will connect to the services in a neutral network if either v1 > p,
or v2 > p or v1 + v2 > p; in a discriminatory network which favors CP1, the user connects if either
v1 + δ > p, or v2 − δ > p or v1 + v2 > p. Hence, if the ISP switches from neutral network to the
discriminatory network favoring CP1, that is, if δ ≥ 0, the change in demand is
∆D(δ) =
∫ p
p−δ
F (p− x; s2)dF (x; s1)−
∫ p+δ
p
F (p− x; s1)dF (x; s2),
Clearly, ∆D(δ) = 0 for δ = 0; then the ISP prefers a network favoring CP1 to a neutral network
if
∂∆D(δ)
∂δ
= F (δ; s2)f(p− δ; s1)− F (−δ; s1)f(p+ δ; s2) > 0
we have
sign{∂∆D(δ)
∂δ
} = sign{f(p− δ; s1)
F (−δ; s1) −
f(p+ δ; s2)
F (δ; s2)
}
then it is easy to show that
f(p− δ; s1)
F (−δ; s1) >
f(p+ δ; s1)
F (δ; s1)
>
f(p+ δ; s2)
F (δ; s2)
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hence ∂∆D(δ)/∂δ > 0 for all δ, so the ISP prefers a maximum discriminatory network favoring
CP1 to a neutral network. Similarly, when the ISP favors CP2, the demand increases and the
change in demand is
∆D(−δ) =
∫ p
p−δ
F (p− x; s1)dF (x; s2)−
∫ p+δ
p
F (p− x; s2)dF (x; s1)
Therefore, we have
∆D(δ)−∆D(−δ) =
∫ p+δ
p−δ
(f(x; s1)F (p− x; s2)− f(x; s2)F (p− x; s1))dx
Then as long as δ is small enough(δ < p − δ), we must have ∆D(δ) > ∆D(−δ) for all δ. So
the ISP always prefers to favor CP1 rather than CP2.
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Chapter 3
Limited Attention
An important feature of advertisements is that they attract attention from con-
sumers. When a product is characterized by several attributes, firms also strategically
use advertisements to manipulate the attention of consumers. A monopolist tends
to advertise too few attributes, and competition does not necessarily improve the
situation. Moreover, in an attention-scarce economy, competition for consumers at-
tention leads firms to advertise fewer attributes and reduces information available to
consumers.
3.1 Introduction
Two important roles of advertisements have been well analyzed in the literature: informational
and persuasive. The former one refers to the fact that advertisements inform consumers the
existence of a product; and the latter one improves the perceived value of a product and persuades
consumers to purchase. In this paper, we try to explore the role of advertisements in attracting
and manipulating the attention of consumers.
It is a well-documented fact that consumers have limited attention,1 i.e. they don’t pay at-
tention to all available information, instead they sample a subset of information and base their
decisions on the sample. A consumer may not know the existence of a product unless he sees an
advertisement of the product; in addition, the consumer may not pay attention to specific features
of the product unless they are evoked in the advertisement. Therefore, an advertisement not only
1See DellaVigna (2009) for a survey on empirical evidences of limited attention.
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indicates the existence and valuation of a product, it also attracts consumers’ attention to the
advertised features of the product.
For instance, a car manufacturer advertises its new model, in addition to features that con-
sumers know well such as color and fuel efficiency, it can also decide whether and how much to
advertise its new internal design, of which consumers differentiate in their tastes. If this new design
draws the attention of a consumer, his valuation for the new model will be more dispersed com-
pared to a consumer who does not pay attention to the new design, as this new design introduces
additional variation. Therefore, when this new design is more heavily advertised, more consumers
will pay attention to this new attribute, and valuations for the new model becomes more dispersed.
In other words, increasing the advertising intensity of more attributes brings more information
into consumers’ attention, which results in more consumers with higher valuations (when they like
the new design), but also more consumers with lower valuations (when they do not like the new
design). In the terminology of Johnson and Myatt (2006), this leads to a rotation of the demand
function for the product.
Thus, for a monopolist whose product having a mass market position and targeting the general
public, its main objective is to reduce the number of consumers who have low valuations. Hence,
it advertises as less attributes as possible, so as to limit the attention that consumers pay to
those attributes and reduce the dispersion of valuations. This leads to distortions in consumers’
choices and reduces consumer welfare, as all purchase decisions are based on limited information.
However, competition does not necessarily improve the information available to consumers.
Consider first the situation where consumers know the existence of competing firms, and firms
only decides how intensive to advertise new attributes of their products. In the case of sym-
metric firms, the effect of competition on advertising strategies crucially depends on the form of
advertising. If advertisements are out-of-store, any advertised attributes will be brought to each
consumer’s attention. This not only affects how consumers evaluate the advertised product, but
also how they evaluate other products in the same industry. In this case, firms do not advertise
more attributes than a monopolist. This is because each firm’s advertising changes the way how
consumers evaluate the whole industry, which hurts all firms. On the contrary, if advertisements
are in-store, they have a larger effect on the attention paid to the advertised product and a weaker
effect on how consumers evaluate other products. In this situation, firms have incentives to adver-
tise more so as to induce more high-value consumers, which improves their competitive advantages.
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And consumers are better-off as well due to improved information. When we take into account
that advertising also attract consumers’ attention to the existence of a product, our analysis shows
that firms advertise more out-of-store and less in-store in an attention-scarce economy, i.e. when
most consumers are attention limited. This is because firms’ primary goal is to attract consumers’
attention to the existence of their products, and this is done by out-of-store advertising, which is
accompanied with less information.
If firms are asymmetric, i.e. each firm holds a competitive advantage over others on cer-
tain attributes, then each firm has an incentive to advertise its advantageous attributes even if
advertisements are out-of-store. However, this incentive may be dominated by the incentive to
manipulate consumers’ attention, when consumers are heterogeneous in their attention capacity.
We show that firms may advertise too little if there are a large number of consumers who have high
attention capacity. The reason is straightforward: each firm advertising its advantageous attribute
leads to more consumers who pay attention to all attributes of a product, and this reduces total
demand. The incentive to manipulate the attention of those high attention consumers dominates
the incentive to build competitive advantage when there are a large number of such consumers.
Therefore, consumer welfare could be reduced when there are more rational consumers with high
attention capacity, as this induces firms to advertise less and reduces the amount of information
available.
Our paper belongs to the growing literature on psychology and economics, especially on effects
of limited attention. Several papers have studied the consequence of limited attention on hierarchy
(Geanakoplos and Milgrom (1991)), product quality (Armstrong and Chen (2009)), information
disclosure (Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003)) etc. In terms of limited attention and advertising, most
papers (Van Zandt (2004), Falkinger (2007, 2008), Anderson and De Palma (2012), Hefti (2012),
etc) have explored the informational role of advertising, i.e. they assume that advertising is to
inform consumers the existence of products and firms have to compete for such awareness. We
take a step further in assuming that advertisements not only inform consumers the existence
but also specific attributes of products. In other words, our focus is not on the intensity of
advertising, but on the “content”of advertising (Anderson and Renault (2006)). Secondly, our
paper is related to the literature on competition and information disclosure, especially on the
disclosure of horizontal match information. Among others, Sun (2011), Hotz and Xiao (2013) have
shown that competition may not lead to full disclosure when there is also vertical differentiation.
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Anderson and Renault (2009) also explored the incentive to disclose horizontal match information
in the context comparative advertising. In their model, quality difference between firms plays a
key role in determining firms’ disclosure incentives. In addition, consumers have access to the same
set of information in their model; whereas consumers may have access to different information due
to their attention limitations in our model. In our paper, the intention to manipulate consumers’
attention provides another reason why competition does not improve information availability in
a market even without vertical differentiation. Another closely related paper is Persson (2012),
where the incentive to manipulate attention is derived in a principal-agent framework.
The paper is organized as follows: We present the basic model in Section 2, where we study the
strategy of a monopolist and the effect of competition with out-of-store and in-store advertising;
Section 3 shows several extensions and discussions; Section 4 concludes. All omitted proofs are
presented in the Appendix.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Benchmark: The Monopoly Case
A monopolistic firm sells a product to a unit mass of consumers. Each consumer demands only
one unit of the product. The product is characterized by two attributes: a “default”attribute 0
and an additional attribute a. The valuation that a consumer generates from the product is given
by
v = v0 + γva,
where v0 and va are the values that a consumer generates from attribute 0 and attribute a respec-
tively, and γ measures how much attention a consumer pays to attribute a. The outside option is
u, if a consumer chooses not to buy the product.
The idiosyncratic match value v0 and va are independently drawn from distribution F0(·)
and Fa(·), and the values drawn by different consumers are independent. We assume that both
distributions have zero mean2, with variance σ0 and σa respectively, and they are symmetric
2This is without loss of generality: we can write the utility function as v = E(v0) + (v0 − E(v0)) + γva, where
E(v0) is the expectation of v0. Clearly, v0 − E(v0) has zero mean. And our main result is not affected by such
variation.
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around 0. Then the distribution of v is given by
F (v; γ) =
∫ ∫
v0+γva≤v
dF0(v0)dFa(va).
The attention level γ captures the fact that consumers have limited attention, which is well
documented in a lot of experiments. Attention as a resource is constrained in capacity either
physically or psychologically. For instance, when a consumer shops for some wine in a supermarket,
she may not pay attention to all information available (either the information on the price tag, or
the information printed on the bottle) due to time constraint or lack of knowledge.
We assume that γ can be either 0 or 1. A consumer with γ = 0 only cares about the default
attribute, and pays no attention to the additional attribute a, and thus his valuation for the
product is simply drawn from F (v; 0) = F0(·). Instead, a consumer with γ = 1 pays full attention
to attributes a, and his valuation is drawn from F (v; 1), which has mean zero, and variance σ0+σa.
When there is a proportion s of consumers paying attention to attribute a, and the rest 1− s
only paying attention to the default attribute, the valuation for the firm’s product in the whole
population is drawn from
G(v; s) = (1− s)F (v; 0) + sF (v; 1).
Clearly, we have
∂G(v; s)
∂s
= F (v; 1)− F (v; 0).
And it is straightforward to show that
∂G(v; s)
∂s
= F (v; 1)− F (v; 0)
 < 0 if v > 0;> 0 if v < 0. (3.1)
i.e. G(v; s) is increasing in s for v < 0 and decreasing in s for v > 0. Following the definition of
Johnson and Myatt (2006):
Definition 3.1. (Johnson and Myatt 2006): A local change of s leads to a rotation of G(v; s)
if for some v∗ and any v ∈ (−∞,∞),
v > v∗ ⇔ ∂G(v; s)
∂s
< 0 and v < v∗ ⇔ ∂G(v; s)
∂s
> 0.
We easily see that:
Lemma 3.1. G(v; s) is rotation-ordered in s with rotation point 0.
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Higher attention level in the population leads to a more dispersed valuation distribution: more
consumers have very high valuation, and more consumers have very low valuation as well. Simply
speaking, high attention consumers pay attention to more details of a product, and thus their
valuation distributions have a larger variance. In the terminology of Johnson and Myatt, higher
s makes the firm’s product a more niche one. A simple example is when both F0(v) and Fa(v)
are the standard normal distribution φ(·), then F (v; 1) is a normal distribution with expectation
0, and standard variation
√
2. Therefore, G(v; s) gradually rotates from Φ(0, 1) to Φ(0,
√
2) as s
increases from 0 to 1.3
Given that the outside option is u, the demand for the product is
D(s) = 1−G(u; s).
We assume that the firm makes a profit of 1 from one unit of demand, then the above equation
also represents total profit of the firm. It is straightforward to show that:4
Lemma 3.2. The firm’s profit is quasi-convex in s. Moreover, if the outside option u < 0, then
the profit is decreasing in s.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the Proposition 1 of Johnson and Myatt (2006). As the
demand function is rotation-ordered with rotation point being 0, if the outside option is such
that u < 0, it is the same situation as in Johnson and Myatt where the optimal price is below
the rotation point, so the profit is decreasing in s. To be more specific, the demand is D(s) =
1 − G(u; s). As u < 0, G(u; s) is increasing in s from Lemma 1, and thus D(s) is decreasing in
s.
When the outside option is below 0, the product has a mass product position. And thus to
maximize profit, the firm needs to minimize the number of consumers with low valuations, which
is achieved when the variance of the valuation distribution is minimized, that is when s = 0. In
3Another example is the linear distribution: If F0(v) and Fa(v) are uniform distributions on [−θ, θ], we can also
show that changes in s also lead to a rotation of G(v; s).
4We focus on the advertising strategy of the firm, so the firm only chooses s but not the price. The result still
holds even when the firm also makes price decisions. To incorporate this, we need to assume that E(v0) > 0, and
the optimal price when the firm does not advertise the additional attribute is p < E(v0). The important thing
is that the product features a mass-market position. This also facilitates our comparison between monopoly and
competition.
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other words, when the product features a mass market, profit is maximized with the broadest
design.
Lemma 3.2 implies that consumers with higher attention level actually hurts the firm if the
firm’s product features a mass-market position. More attentive consumers care about more details
of the product, which implies that it is more likely that they would find out some negative facts
of the product and thus choose not to purchase.
In the following, we focus on the situation where the outside option is negative.
Assumption 3.1. u < 0.
In reality, a firm has a number of ways to affect the attention level of consumers, i.e. s depends
on strategies chosen by the firm. Here, we focus on advertising and the information content of
advertisements. The firm has free access to one unit of resource for advertising. For now, we
suppose that informing consumers about the existence of a product is not a concern, the firm
rather advertises to keep their products imposed to consumers. So the firm always fully uses
its advertising resource, and it chooses whether to spend any of this resource on the additional
attribute a. If the firm advertises attribute a with intensity s, a proportion s of consumers pay
attention to a, and the rest do not.5 Then it is straightforward to have the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1. Under Assumption 3.1, the firm does not advertise the additional attribute a,
i.e. s = 0.
When the firm’s product features a mass market, information hurts the firm and thus it chooses
to minimize the information provided to consumers, that is to advertise no additional attribute
except the default one which every consumer pays attention to.6 In other words, the firm only
informs consumers about the existence of its product, but not any information about the product
in addition to what consumers have already known.
5We can think of the situation where each consumer has a capacity of attention equal to 1: this unit of attention
is randomly drawn by one of the advertising messages. Hence, if the attention is drawn by a message containing the
information about attribute a, this consumer pays attention to a; otherwise, he does not pay attention to a. When
the firm sends out s messages that contains information about a, the proportion of consumers that eventually pay
attention to a is then s.
6This result does not depend on whether consumers have limited attention or not. As long as the attention level
is manipulatable, the firm has incentive to divert consumers’ attention to the default attribute.
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3.2.2 The Case of Competition
As shown in the previous section, a monopolist advertises “too little”. And consumers make
suboptimal decisions based only on information about the default attribute. A natural question
to ask is whether competition can mitigate such problem, i.e. would competition induce firms to
advertise the additional attribute, and bring everything into consumers’ attention?
Suppose now there are two firms: firm 1 and firm 2. As before, each firm has one unit
of advertising resource to allocate. We distinguish between two cases: the first is out-of-store
advertising where each firm’s advertising affects consumers’ attention allocation when evaluating
both firms’ products; the second is in-store advertising where one firm’s advertising only affects
how consumers evaluate its own product. We start with the out-of-store advertising case.
3.2.2.1 Out-of-Store Advertising
Advertisements such as outdoor billboards advertisements draw attention of all consumers,
and thus an advertisement of one product may also affect how a consumer thinks about other
products in the same market. For instance, an outdoor advertisement of BMW which introducing
some new features also induces consumers to think about whether Benz offers the same features.
In others words, any information contained in such advertisements not only attracts consumers
attention when they visit the store of the advertised product, but also has long-lasting effect when
they are out-of-store.7 To capture this effect, we assume that an attribute advertised by one firm
attracts consumers attention when they evaluate both firms’ products. Specifically, suppose each
firm i has one unit of advertising resource, and it decides a share si of this resource to be spent on
the additional attribute a. And then the proportion of consumers who pay attention to attribute
a is
s =
s1 + s2
2
,
which is increasing in both s1 and s2. And we have the following result:
8
7This type of out-of-store advertising not only includes various types of outdoor advertising, but also some
information pamphlets which consumers can take away in the sense that the information contained in the pamphlets
may still affect how consumers think when they evaluate other products.
8As in the monopoly case, we assume that firms only choose advertising strategies but not prices. In the
competition case, firms’ prices will be constrained by the outside option. And the following results hold as long as
the constrained prices are below E(v0).
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Proposition 3.2. When advertising is out-of-store, both firms do not advertise the additional
attribute, i.e. s1 = s2 = 0.
Proof. Given that firm j chooses sj, the demand for firm i is
Di(si, sj) =
1
2
(1−G2(u; si + sj
2
)),
as two firms share the total demand which is 1−G2(u; si+sj
2
). Therefore, given sj, any positive si
leads to a wider dispersion of consumers’ valuations, which lowers the total demand and thus the
demand for firm i. Hence, we have si = 0.
When advertising is out-of-store, any information in advertising affects consumers’ valuation
for the products symmetrically, i.e. consumers’ valuations for both products are drawn from the
same distribution. Hence, any advertising that increases the dispersion of valuations will hurt both
firms. And thus competition does not improve the information available to consumers with out-of-
store advertising. In addition, the joint profit of two firms attains its maximum with out-of-store
advertising, which acts as a coordinating device for the two firms.
Remark Out-of-store advertising does not improve the information available to consumers, but
consumers can still benefit from competition: they have more firms to choose, which increases the
probability that they find something better than the outside option.
3.2.2.2 In-Store Advertising
Now we turn to the case of in-store advertising: this type of advertising is mostly carried
out through sales talks, information contained in such advertisements would attract consumers’
attention only when they visit the store, and thus only affect consumers’ evaluation for the ad-
vertised product. In other words, such advertising has strong effects in-store, but has limited long
lasting effect when consumers are out-of-store. This distinction between out-of-store and in-store
advertising may be too extreme, however, we emphasize that in-store advertising has a weaker
“spillover”effect than out-of-store advertising in affecting consumers’ attention towards products
other than the advertised one.9
As before, each firm has one unit of advertising resource to allocate, if firm 1 and 2 allocates s1
and s2 of their advertising resource to attribute a, then the attention level that a consumer pays
9For instance, the information from a salesman of BMW may still affect a consumer’s evaluation for a Benz, but
this effect is weaker than a take-away pamphlet due to short-memory, or manipulation from a salesman of Benz.
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to attribute a of product 1 is s1, and s2 is the attention level paid to the additional attribute of
product 2. Hence, consumers’ valuations for products of firm 1 and 2 are drawn from distribution
G(v1; s1) and G(v2; s2) respectively.
The demands for firm 1 and firm 2 are then given by
D1 =
∫ ∞
u
G(v1; s2)dG(v1; s1)
and
D2 =
∫ ∞
u
G(v2; s1)dG(v2; s2)
And we have the following proposition:
Proposition 3.3. When advertising is in-store, each firm fully advertises the additional attribute,
i.e. s1 = s2 = 1, if the outside option is not too small.
Proof. See Appendix 3.5.1.
When advertising is in-store, each firm has incentive to induce more consumers to pay attention
to every detail of its product: this leads to a higher probability that a consumer has higher
valuation for its product than that of the opponent, and thus improves its competitive advantage.
However, both firms are worse-off than in the case of out-of-store advertising.
Corollary 3.1. The demands for both firms are lower with in-store advertising than with out-of-
store advertising.
Proof. Under in-store advertising, each firm gets a demand of
D(1, 1) =
1
2
(1−G(u; 1)G(u; 1))
and the demand under out-of-store advertising is
D(0, 0) =
1
2
(1−G(u; 0)G(u; 0))
And clearly D(1, 1) < D(0, 0) as G(u; 1) > G(u; 0) for u < 0.
The equilibrium under in-store advertising is a form of prisoner’s dilemma: each firm wants
to draw consumers’ attention to more details of its product, but in the end this reduces the total
demand. However, consumers benefit from such in-store advertising: each consumer makes the
right choice based on all information available under in-store advertising, whereas with out-of-store
advertising they might make the wrong choice.
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Corollary 3.2. Consumers are better-off under in-store advertising than under out-of-store ad-
vertising.
Remark We have focused on the two extreme cases of out-of-store advertising and in-store
advertising. In reality, firms normally use a mixture of these two. The above analysis indicates
that the information available to consumers decreases with the share of out-of-store advertising.
In addition, this implies that if firms could cooperate on their advertising strategy, they would
favor out-of-store advertising and this again reduces information availability.
3.2.3 Attention Attraction vs. Attention Manipulation
The above two extreme cases show us the incentive for attention manipulation when consumers
have already known the existence of both firms. And they are the building blocks when we take
into account the fact that advertisements attract consumers’ attention to the advertised product
at the first place. Specifically, consumers get to notice the existence of a product when they
see advertisements of the product, and then they will pay additional attention to details of the
product.
In our model, we can simply incorporate this feature of advertising by assuming that a consumer
gets aware of a product when he sees an out-of-store advertisement of the product; and when he
enters the store, he gets further information from in-store advertisement in addition to what has
been contained in the out-of-store advertisement. Under this assumption, out-of-store advertising
serves to attract consumers’ attention, and both out-of-store and in-store advertising serve to
manipulate consumers’ attention.
As before, each firm i has one unit of advertising resource, which can be allocated between
out-of-store advertising souti and in-store advertising s
in
i . Furthermore, firms also decide what
information to include in the out-of-store and in-store advertising. For simplicity, we also assume
that a proportion of 1 − α consumers are attention limited, they only pay attention to one out-
of-store advertising message and thus get aware of at most one product; the rest α proportion
of consumers are attention unlimited and they get aware of both products as long as they are
advertised. Then it is easy to show that:
Proposition 3.4. In the symmetric equilibrium, there exist α¯ such that, if α < α¯, both firms only
use out-of-store advertising and they do not advertise the additional attribute.
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Proof. See Appendix 3.5.3.
A firm faces a trade-off between exploiting limited attention consumers and competing for
full attention consumers. On one hand, a firm wants to advertise more out-of-store and disclose
limited information in order to attract those limited attention consumers (each firm has monopoly
power over limited attention consumers who are aware of only its product, and thus it does
not advertise any additional attribute); on the other hand, a firm wants to advertise more in-
store and disclose more information in order to win those full attention consumers. Hence, in
an attention-scarce economy (α small), the first incentive dominates and competing to attract
consumers attention leads firms to rely more on out-of-store advertising, which correspondingly
results in less information availability.
The analysis in the section resembles that of Section III.B in Johnson and Myatt (2006), where
they differentiated between advertisements consisting of hype information and real information.
In their analysis, advertisements with hype information do not change the dispersion of value
distribution, whereas advertisements with real information lead to demand rotation. Under their
assumption, a monopolist prefers either full information (real information advertising) or total
ignorance (hype information advertising).
We depart from their analysis in several ways: First, in our model advertisements always
provide real information, but firms can choose how much real information to advertise. Second,
we explicitly model the role of advertising in attracting and manipulating attention of consumers.
Third, and most importantly, we show how competition affects firms’ choice between out-of-
store advertising (which provides less real information) and in-store advertising (which provides
more real information). Particularly, we show that this effect depends on the attention level
of consumers. In other words, we present a simple situation where firms indeed prefer hype
information advertising: when firms have to compete for consumer awareness in an attention-
scarce economy.
Anderson and Renault (2009) also studies whether firms disclose horizontal information in
the presence of vertical differentiation. In their model, once a firm discloses some horizontal
information, all consumers get aware of that information (although they differentiate in their
valuation for that information). We take a different approach and emphasize that consumers may
evaluate different products based on different information sets, due to the fact that attention of a
consumer is limited and manipulable.
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3.3 Extensions and Discussions
3.3.1 Multiple Attributes
So far, we have focused on a single attribute in addition to the default one. The situation
is basically the same when there are possibly more than one attribute to advertise, as long as
consumers evaluate the products in the same way (they have the same attention level).
Suppose there are two additional attributes a and b, the valuations of which are drawn from
the same distribution. All consumers are attention limited: they pay attention to at most one
additional attribute. It is clear that in the out-of-store advertising case, no firm advertises any of
the additional attributes. In the in-store advertising case, each firm fully advertises the additional
attributes.10
The situation is slightly different when the additional attributes are asymmetric: Suppose that
the valuation of one attribute, say a, is drawn from a distribution with a larger variance than
the other attribute b.11 It is obvious that no firm advertises if advertising is out-of-store. In the
in-store advertising case, the only equilibrium is that both firms fully advertise attribute b. The
reason is the same as Proposition 3.3: each firm wants to induce more high value consumers to
build its competitive advantage over the other firm. Even though competition in this case does
not lead to complete advertising, it does induce firms to provide the more valuable information to
consumers.
3.3.2 Heterogeneous Consumers
In the above analysis, we have assumed that consumers are homogeneous. Now we briefly
study the situation when consumers are heterogeneous in their attention levels: a proportion p
of consumers have their attention capacity equal to one, so they randomly draw one advertising
message and pay attention to the attribute contained in this message if there were any; the rest
1 − p of the consumers have larger attention capacity, for simplicity, say two units of attention.
So they draw two advertising messages and pay attention to what is contained in the messages.
Heterogeneous consumers does not bring any difference when there is only one additional attribute
10A firm can divide the advertising space between the two additional attributes, as a consumer’s valuation is
drawn from the same distribution no matter whether he pays attention to a or b.
11Both distributions still have zero mean.
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or in the out-of-store advertising case, so we focus on in-store advertising with two attributes a
and b.
Consider a simple extension of the above model: Each firm i can spend sai proportion of its
advertising space on attribute a, and sbi on attribute b. Then the proportion of consumers who
only pay attention to attribute a is
αa(s
a
i , s
b
i) = s
a
i p+ ((s
a
i )
2 + 2sai (1− sai − sbi))(1− p),
where the first term is those consumers who have one attention capacity and draw an advertising
message about a; the second term is those consumers who have two attention capacity and draw
two messages about a, or one message about a and one with no additional attribute. Similarly,
the proportion of consumers who only pay attention to attribute b is
αb(s
a
i , s
b
i) = s
b
ip+ ((s
b
i)
2 + 2sbi(1− sai − sbi))(1− p);
the proportion of consumers who pay attention to both attributes is
αa,b(s
a
i , s
b
i) = 2s
a
i s
b
i(1− p).
And the rest of consumers only pay attention to the default attribute.12
The valuation of a consumer who pays attention to both attribute is
u = v + va + vb.
It is clear that these consumers have a valuation distribution that is more dispersed than those
who only pay attention to one attribute.
Therefore, in the in-store advertising case, if the two attributes are symmetric, each firm has
an incentive to induce more consumers to pay attention to both attributes. Hence, both firms
must choose to allocate equally the advertising resource to both attributes, that is
sai = s
b
i =
1
2
, for i = 1, 2.
12It is easy to see that αa(1, 0) = 1 and αb(0, 1) = 1. When the firm only advertise one attribute, those consumers
with higher attention level also only pay attention to the advertised attribute. In this setup, if the attention level
of a consumer goes to infinity, then this consumer pays attention to everything that is advertised, no matter what
is the advertising intensity.
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Competition for high attention capacity consumers, who are also more valuable, leads firms to
advertise more about their products, and this in turn benefit these high attention consumers, as
they now evaluate the product more thoroughly.
Remark When the two attributes are asymmetric, it might be the case that each firm only
advertises one attribute, and we present such a case in Appendix 3.5.2.
3.3.3 Asymmetric Firms
In the previous analysis, we have assumed that the two firms are symmetric, i.e. the valuations
for the same attribute of the two products are drawn from the same distribution. Suppose now
the two firms are differentiated, and firm 1 has a competitive advantage over firm 2 on attribute a:
the valuation for attribute a of firm 1 is drawn from a distribution that first-order-stochastically
dominates that of firm 2. For simplicity, we assume that the distribution of attribute a for firm
1 is drawn from Fa(v) with zero mean and variance σ; whereas for firm 2 it is drawn from F
δ(v)
with mean δ < 0 and variance σ, that is F δ(v) = Fa(v − δ).
We have seen that when firms are symmetric, no firm advertises the additional attribute in the
out-of-store advertising case. This may not be the case when firms are asymmetric, as firm 1, who
has a competitive advantage over firm 2, has an incentive to advertise attribute a. To see this, if
firm 2 does not advertise, the demand of firm 1 when it advertises a with intensity s is given by
D(s, 0) = s
∫ ∞
u
F (v, δ; 1)dF (v; 1) + (1− s)
∫ ∞
u
F (v; 0)dF (v; 0),
where the first term on the right hand side is the demand from consumers who pay attention to
a, and
F (v, δ; 1) =
∫ ∫
v0+va≤v
dF0(v0)dFa(va − δ),
is the valuation distribution for product 2 when consumers pay attention to attribute a; and the
second term is the demand from those who do not pay attention to a.
Therefore, firm 1 will advertise attribute a if
D+ =
∫ ∞
u
F (v, δ; 1)dF (v; 1) >
∫ ∞
u
F (v; 0)dF (v; 0) = D0.
Clearly, the inequality does not satisfy when δ = 0, which is the case of symmetric firms. It is
easy to see that the left-hand-side is decreasing in δ, and thus the inequality is satisfied for δ small
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enough, i.e. if the competitive advantage of firm 1 over attribute a is high enough (as δ < 0). On
the other hand, firm 2 has no incentive to advertise a, as this always decreases its demand.
This implies that if there are multiple attributes, and firms have their competitive advantage
over different attributes, then it might be the case that all attributes would be advertised even
with out-of-store advertising. This is true when all consumers are attention limited, i.e. they only
pay attention to at most one attribute. Specifically, suppose there are two attributes a and b: firm
1 has competitive advantage over a as defined above, and firm 2 has competitive advantage over b
which can be similarly defined. The above analysis has shown that firm 1 will advertise attribute
a if the competitive advantage is high enough. The same reasoning indicates that firm 2 also has
an incentive to advertise b.
However, this may not necessarily be the case if consumers are heterogeneous, i.e. when
some have higher attention level.13 Suppose as before a proportion p consumers have one unit of
attention capacity, and the rest 1− p have two units of attention capacity. We have the following
result:
Proposition 3.5. In the asymmetric firm case, firms’ advertising intensity on the additional
attributes decreases with the proportion of consumers with high attention capacity.
Proof. See Appendix 3.5.4, where we also give a proof when the high attention capacity consumers
have infinite attention capacity.
The logic of the above proposition is straightforward: each firm has an incentive to advertise
the attribute over which it has a competitive advantage. However, by doing so, all full attention
consumers will pay attention to both attributes and this hurts both firms. Therefore, when there
is a large number of such consumers, firms instead choose to advertise less.
The proposition shows that when a lot of consumers are attention-limited, competition induces
firms to advertise both attributes which benefit full attention consumers; however, when a large
proportion of consumers have full attention, the information available is reduced. And thus con-
sumer welfare may not be monotonic with the attention level p: as p decreases, firms gradually
change their strategy to “hide”some attributes of their products. In other words, the presence of
low attention consumers exerts positive externality on full attention consumers. Individually, each
13Here, we abstract from attention attraction as in Section 3.2.3, and assume that all consumers know the
existence of both products.
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consumer would be better off if he pays full attention to firms’ products; however, collectively it
would be better for the whole population to maintain some level of attention limitation. This also
relates to some discussion about consumer knowledge: if most consumers only understand a small
subset of aspects of a product, firms may choose to disclose all information so as to win those
knowledgeable consumers; however, if more and more consumers get to understand every detail of
the product, firms may choose to disclose less information which in turn hurt consumers.
This may also shed light on the difference between online shopping and off-line shopping: online
shopping is characterized by information overload, which can be a result of the fact that online
shoppers are more time-constrained than off-line shoppers, and thus online shoppers exhibit more
attention limitation.
3.3.4 Costly Advertising
The above analysis has focus on costless advertising where firms have free access to advertising
resource. This can be thought of as the situation in the short-run, where firms have sunk their
costs of acquiring advertising space such as billboards and they only decide what information to
be included in the advertisements. In the long-run, firms may also need to decide how much
advertising resource to invest, especially as in-store advertising is probably less costly than out-
of-store advertising.14
Incorporating costly advertising introduces additional trade-offs between marginal benefits and
marginal costs of out-of-store and in-store advertising. Compared with our benchmark costless
advertising model, firms use relatively more in-store advertising due to its low cost, however, this
does not alter our basic intuition. In an attention-scarce economy, the marginal benefit of out-of-
store advertising would be higher than that of in-store advertising, which is the dominating effect
as long as the cost difference between two types of advertising is not too large. And thus firms
tends to advertise more out-of-store and information available to consumers is limited.15
14The cost of out-of-store advertising includes, for instance, bidding for billboards, designing advertisements, etc.
The cost of in-store advertising includes training salesmen and providing pamphlets, etc.
15A firm may incur additional costs when it includes more information in advertising, however such costs are
likely to be less significant than bidding for advertising space and training employees.
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3.4 Conclusion
We study how firms may use advertisements to manipulate consumers’ attention. A monopolist
advertises too few attributes and this reduces consumer welfare. Whether competition improves
this situation depends on the form of advertising. When advertisements are out-of-store and
affect how consumers evaluate products at the industry level, competition does not increase the
information available to consumers; when advertisements are in-store and mainly affect consumers’
evaluation at the product level, competition may lead to higher information availability. We also
show that consumer heterogeneity plays a key role in shaping firms’ advertising strategy when they
are asymmetric. Our results suggest that instead of information overload, attention manipulation
and the resulting information insufficiency may also be a serious concern.
3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Given s2, we have
∂D1
∂s1
=
∫∞
u G(v; s2)d
∂G(v;s1)
∂s1
= −G(u; s2)∂G(u;s1)∂s1 −
∫∞
u
∂G(v;s1)
∂s1
dG(v; s2)
= −(∫u−∞ ∂G(u;s1)∂s1 dG(v; s2) + ∫∞u ∂G(v;s1)∂s1 dG(v; s2))
= − ∫∞−u(∂G(v;s1)∂s1 − ∂G(−u;s1)∂s1 )dG(v; s2). (use the symmetry of G(v; s) and g(v; s))
If u = 0, we have
∂G(v; s1)
∂s1
< 0 for all v > 0, and
∂G(0; s1)
∂s1
= 0.
Therefore, ∂D1/∂s1 > 0. Hence, for all u that is close to zero, we have that the demand for firm
1 is increasing in s1. So we must have s1 = 1 in equilibrium. The same reasoning indicates that
s2 = 1 also.
Notice that
∂
∂G(v; s1)
∂s1
/∂v =
∂g(v; s1)
∂s1
Due to the symmetry of g(v; s), there must exist v¯ such that
∂g(v; s1)
∂s1
< 0 for 0 < v < v¯ and
∂g(v; s1)
∂s1
> 0 for v > v¯.
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Hence, if u = −v¯, we have
∂G(v; s1)
∂s1
≥ ∂G(−u; s1)
∂s1
for all v ≥ −u,
and then ∂D1/∂s1 < 0. Therefore, there exists u˜ ∈ (−v¯, 0) such that
∂D1
∂s1
(u; s1)|u=u˜ = 0.
And ∂D1/∂s1 > 0 for all u ∈ (u˜, 0].
3.5.2 Heterogeneous Consumers with Asymmetric Attributes
When consumers are heterogeneous in their attention capacity, and the valuation of attribute
b is drawn from a more dispersed distribution, both firms advertising only attribute b may also be
an equilibrium.
Suppose firm 2 only advertise b, if firm 1 advertises both attributes, the profit is given by
pipa,b = αa(sa, sb)D(a, b) + αb(sa, sb)D(b, b) + (1− αa − αb)(sa, sb)D(ab, b)
where D(k, b) denotes the demand for firm 1 when the consumer only pays attention to attribute
b of firm 2 and pays attention to attribute k of firm 1. As we can see, there is a gain from full
attention consumers, as D(ab, b) > D(b, b); but there is a loss from partial attention consumers
who only pay attention to attribute a, as D(a, b) < D(b, b). Therefore, if it is difficult to induce
consumers to pay attention to both attributes, firm 1 may find it profitable to only advertise
attribute b; specifically, this is satisfied if
αa1 − αa2
αb2 − αb1 >
D(ab, b)−D(b, b)
D(ab, b)−D(a, b)
which means that the marginal effect of advertising attribute a on the proportion of consumers
who only pay attention to a is relatively large compared to the proportion of consumers who pay
attention to both attributes. 16
16As we can see, whether this condition holds depends on the shape of α(sa, sb). In the quadratic interpretation,
this condition is not satisfied.
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3.5.3 Proof of Proposition 3.4
In the symmetric equilibrium, sout1 = s
out
2 = s
out and sin1 = s
in
2 = s
in. If sout = 1 and sin = 0,
the profit of each firms is given by
pi =
1− α
2
D(0) + αD(0; 0).
In order for this to be an equilibrium, both firms have no incentive to reduce out-of-store advertising
and use the resource for in-store advertising. Precisely, the condition means that
(1− α)[∂D(s)
∂s
|s=0 − 1
4
] + α
∂D(s1; 0)
∂s1
|s1=0 < 0,
which is satisfied if α < α¯, where α¯ satisfies
α¯ =
(1− α¯)(∂D(s)
∂s
|s=0 − 14)
∂D(s1;0)
∂s1
|s1=0
.
It can be easily seen that α¯ ∈ (0, 1), as the right hand side is positive when α¯ = 0 (as ∂D(s)
∂s
|s=0 < 0),
and equals zero when α¯ = 1 (as ∂D(s1;0)
∂s1
|s1=0 > 0) .
Moreover, in this equilibrium, both firms do not advertise the additional attribute, as this cor-
responds to the pure out-of-store advertising case and the result follows directly from Proposition
3.2.
3.5.4 Proof of Proposition 3.5
If one firm decides to advertise some additional attributes, it only advertise the one that it has
competitive advantage. Advertising the attribute in which it is disadvantageous either increases
the proportion of consumers who only pay attention to this attribute, or reduces the proportion
of those who pay attention to no additional attributes, both of which hurt the firm. Hence, firm
1 chooses to advertise attribute a with intensity sa and firm 2 chooses sb to advertise attribute b.
Given sa, the demand of firm 2 is given by
D2(sa, sb) = [
p
2
sa + (1− p)(( sa2 )2 + sa(1− sa+sb2 ))]D−
+[p
2
sb + (1− p)(( sb2 )2 + sb(1− sa+sb2 ))]D+
+1
2
sasb(1− p)Df
+[p(1− sa+sb
2
) + (1− p)(1− sa+sb
2
)2]D0
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where D+ and D0 are given in the main text; D
− is demand for a firm from consumers who only
pay attention to its disadvantageous attribute, that is
D− =
∫ ∞
u
F (v; 1)dF (v, δ; 1);
and Df is the demand from those consumers who pay attention to both attributes, that is
Df =
∫ ∞
u
F (v, δ; 1, 1)dF (v, δ; 1, 1),
where
F (v, δ; 1, 1) =
∫ ∫ ∫
v0+va+vb≤v
dF0(v0)dFa(va)dFa(vb − δ),
is the valuation distribution of those consumers who pay attention to both attributes.
The first order condition is given by
∂D2
∂sb
=
1− p
2
sa(Df −D−) + (1− p)(1− sa + sb
2
)(D+ −D0) + p
2
(D+ −D0).
If p = 1, i.e. all consumers are attention limited, then
∂D2
∂sb
=
1
2
(D+ −D0) > 0,
which means that both firms fully advertise their advantageous attribute. If sa = 0, all consumers
only pay attention to b if sb > 0, and we have
∂D2
∂sb
= ((1− p)(1− sb
2
) +
p
2
)(D+ −D0) > 0,
so firm 2 fully advertises attribute b.
If p < 1, and sa > 0, the best response function of firm 2 is such that
∂sa
∂sb
=
Df −D−
D+ −D0 − 1;
therefore, an symmetric equilibrium exists if Df−D− < 0, and the symmetric equilibrium is given
by
sa = sb = s =
(2− p)(D+ −D0)
(1− p)(2(D+ −D0)− (Df −D−)) .
Then it is easy to check that s < 1 if
p <
D− −Df
(D+ −D0) + (D− −Df ) .
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Otherwise, when p is big enough, the only equilibrium is sa = sb = 1. Moreover, it is obvious that
s is increasing in p. Therefore, when there are more consumers with high attention capacity, the
equilibrium intensity of advertising on additional attribute is lower.
The case of infinite attention capacity
The proof is basically the same as above except that: For those consumers with infinity atten-
tion capacity, they pay attention to both attribute as long as min(sa, sb) > 0. If sa, sb > 0, the
demand of firm 1 is given by
D1(sa, sb) = p
sa
2
D+ + p
sb
2
D− + p
2− sa − sb
2
D0 + (1− p)Df ,
As D+ > D0, firm 1 chooses sa = 1 if it were to advertise a. If sa = 0, the demand of firm 1 is
D1(0, sb) = (p
sb
2
+ 1− p)D− + p2− sb
2
D0.
Therefore, firm 1 does not advertise a if
D1(0, sb) > D1(1, sb)⇔ (1− p)(D− −Df ) > p
2
(D+ −D0);
That is if
p <
2(D− −Df )
2(D− −Df ) + (D+ −D0) ;
and such p exists if D− > Df .
Thus, if p is small enough, firm 1 chooses not to advertise its advantageous attribute if firm 2
has already advertised the other attribute. However, if sb = 0, then firm 1 fully advertise attribute
a as if all consumers are attention limited. Hence, there are two pure-strategy equilibrium when p
is small, either sa = 1, sb = 0 or sa = 0, sb = 1, in both of which only one attribute is advertised.
There is also a mix-strategy equilibrium, where each firm randomize between fully advertis-
ing its advantageous attribute and not advertising at all. However, in such an equilibrium, the
probability that both attributes are advertised is still smaller than one.
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